













































































































The currency crises of the 1990s shocked investors, academics, international civil
servants and policy makers alike. Most analysts had missed the financial weaknesses in
Mexico and East Asia, and once the crises erupted almost every observer was surprised
by their intensity.
1  This inability to predict major financial collapses is as an
embarrassment of sorts by the economics profession.  As a result, during the last few
years macroeconomists in academia, in the multilateral institutions and in investment
banks have been frantically developing crisis “early warning” models.  These models
have focused on a number of variables, including the level and currency composition of
foreign debt, debt maturity, the weakness of the domestic financial sector, the country’s
fiscal position, its level of international reserves, political instability, and real exchange
rate overvaluation, among others.  Interestingly, different authors do not seem to agree on
the role played by current account deficits in recent financial collapses.  While some
analysts have argued that large current account deficits have been behind major currency
crashes, according to others the current account has not been overly important in many of
these episodes.
2  The view that current account deficits have played a limited role in
recent financial debacles in the emerging nations is clearly presented by U.S. Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers who, in his Richard T. Ely lecture argued:
“Traditional macroeconomic variables, in the form of overly inflationary
monetary policies, large fiscal deficits, or even large current account deficits,
were present in several cases, but are not necessary antecedents to crisis in all
episodes.”  (Summers 2000, p. 7, emphasis added).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate in detail the behavior of the current account in
emerging economies, and in particular its role – if any – in financial crises.  Models of
current account behavior are reviewed, and a dynamic model of current account
sustainability is developed.  The empirical analysis is based on a massive data set that
                                                          
1  It should be noted that the crises in Russia (August 1998) and Brazil (January, 1999) were widely
anticipated.
2   For discussions on the causes behind the crises see, for example, Corsetti et. al. (1998), Sachs, et al
(1996), the essays in Dornbusch (2000), and Edwards (1999).2
covers over 120 countries during more than 25 years.  Important controversies related to
the current account – including the extent to which current account deficits crowd out
domestic savings – are also analyzed.  Throughout the paper I am interested on whether
there is evidence supporting the idea that there are costs involved in running “very large”
deficits.  Moreover, I investigate the nature of these potential costs, including whether
they are particularly high in the presence of other type of imbalances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I review
the way in which economists’ views on the current account have evolved in the last 25
years or so.  The discussion deals with academic as well as with policy perspectives, and
includes a review of evolving theoretical models of current account behavior.  The
analysis presented in this section shows that there have been important changes in
economists’ views on the subject: from “deficits matter,” to “deficits are irrelevant if the
public sector is in equilibrium,” back to “deficits matter,” to the current dominant view
“current deficits may matter.” In this section I argue that “equilibrium” models of
frictionless economies are of little help to understand actual current account behavior
and/or to assess a country’s degree of vulnerability. In Section III I focus on models of
the current account sustainability that have recently become popular in financial
institutions, both private and official.  More specifically, I argue that although these
models provide some useful information about the long run sustainability of the external
sector accounts, they are of limited use to determine if, a particular moment in time, a
country’s current account deficit is “too large.”   In order to illustrate this point I develop
a simple model of current account behavior that emphasizes the role of stock adjustments.
In Section IV I use a massive data set to analyze some of the most important aspects of
current account behavior in the world economy during the last quarter century.  The
discussion deals with the following issues: (a) The distribution of current account deficits
across countries and regions.  (b) The relationship between current account deficits,
domestic savings and investment.  (c) The effects of capital account liberalization on
capital controls on the current account.  (d) An analysis of the circumstances surrounding
major current account reversals.  I investigate, in particular, how frequent and how costly
these reversals have been.  In Section V I deal with the relationship between current3
account deficits and financial crisis. I review the existing evidence and I present some
new results.  Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II.  Evolving Views on the Current Account:  Models and Policy Implications
  In this section I analyze the evolving view on current account deficits.  I focus on
theoretical models as well as on policy analyses.  I show that economists’ views have
changed in important ways during the last twenty five years, and I argue that many of
these changes have been the result of important crisis situations in both the advanced and
the emerging nations.
II.1  The Early Emphasis on Flows
In the immediate post-World War II period most discussions on a country’s
external balance were based on the elasticities approach, and focused on flows behavior.
Even authors that understood fully that the current account is equal to income minus
expenditure – including Meade (1951), Harberger (1950), Laurence and Metzler (1950),
Machlup (1943), and Johnson (1955) --, tended to emphasize the relation between
relative price changes and trade flows.
3
This emphasis on elasticities and the balance of trade also affected policy
discussions in the developing nations.  Indeed, until the mid-1970s policy debates in the
less developed countries were dominated by the so-called “elasticities pessimism” view,
and most authors focused on whether a devaluation would result in an improvement in
the country’s external position, including in its trade and current account balances.
Cooper’s (1971a, 1971b) influential work on devaluation crisis in the developing nations
is a good example of this emphasis.  In these papers Cooper analyzed the consequences
of 21 major devaluations in the developing world in the 1958-1969 period, focusing on
the effect of these exchange rate adjustments on the real exchange rate and on the balance
of trade. Cooper (1971a), argued although the relevant elasticities were indeed small,
devaluations had, overall, been successful in helping improve the trade and current
account balances in the countries in his sample.  In an extension of Cooper’s work,
                                                          
3   See, for example, Meade’s (1951) discussion in pages 35-36.4
Kamin (1988) confirmed the results that historically (large) devaluations tended to
improve developing countries’ trade balance.
Authors in the structuralist tradition argued that in the developing nations trade
and current account imbalances were “structural” in nature, and severely constrained
poorer countries’ ability to grow.  According to this view, however, the solution was not
to adjust the country’s peg, but to encourage industrialization through import substitution
policies. In Latin America this view was persuasively articulated by Raul Prebisch, the
charismatic Executive Secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
(CEPAL);  in Asia it found its most respected defender in Professor Mahalanobis, the
father of planning and the architect of India's Second Five Year Plan; and in Africa it was
made the official policy stance with the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980.
II.2  The Current Account as an Intertemporal Phenomenon:  The Lawson Doctrine
and the 1980s Debt Crisis
During the second part of the 1970s, and partially as a result of the oil price
shocks, most countries in the world experienced large swings in their current account
balances.  These developments generated significant concern among policy makers and
analysts, and prompted a number of experts to analyze carefully the determinants of the
current account.  Perhaps the most important analytical development during this period
was a move away from trade flows, and a renewed and formal emphasis on the
intertemporal dimensions of the current account.  The departing point was, of course,
very simple, and was based on the recognition of two interrelated facts.  First, from a
basic national accounting perspective the current account is equal to savings minus
investment.  Second, since both savings and investment decisions are based on
intertemporal factors -- such as life cycle considerations and expected returns on
investment projects --, the current account is necessarily an intertemporal phenomenon.
Sachs (1981) emphasized forcefully the intertemporal nature of the current account,
arguing that, to the extent higher current account deficits reflected new investment
opportunities, there was no reason to be concerned about them.5
II.2.1  Theoretical Issues
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) have provided a comprehensive review of modern
models of the current account that assume intertemporal optimization on behalf of
consumers and firms.  In this type of models, consumption smoothing across periods is
one of the fundamental drivers of the current account.  The most powerful insight of the
modern approach to the current account can be expressed in a remarkably simple
equation.  Assuming a constant world interest rate, equality between the world discount
factor [1/(1+r)] and the representative consumer’s subjective discount factor β , and no
borrowing constraints, the current account deficit (CAD) can be written as:
4
(1)  CADt = (Yt* - Yt) – (It* - It) – (Gt – Gt*),
where Yt, It, and Gt are current output, consumption and government spending,
respectively. Yt*, It*, and Gt*, on the other hand, are the “permanent” levels of these
variables.  The permanent value of Y (Yt*) is defined as :
(2)  Yt* = [r/(1+r)] Σ j=t [r/(1+r)]
j-t Yj.
The sum runs from j=t to infinity.  That is, equation (2) defines the permanent value of Y
as the annuity value computed at the constant interest rate r. The definitions of It* and Gt*
are exactly equivalent to that of Yt* in equation (2).
According to equation (1), if output falls below its permanent value, (Yt* - Yt) >
0, there will be a higher current account deficit.  Similarly, if investment increases above
its permanent value, there will be a higher current account deficit.  The reason for this is
that new investment projects will be partially financed with an increase in foreign
borrowing, thus generating a higher current account deficit.  Likewise, an increase in
government consumption above Gt* will result in a higher current account deficit.
Although equation (1) is very simple, it captures the fundamental insights of modern
current account analysis.  Moreover, extensions of the model, including the relaxation of
                                                          
4   Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 74).  For models that generate similar expressions see, for example, Razin
and Svensson (1983) , Frenkel and Razin (1987) and Edwards (1989).6
the assumption that the subjective discount factor is equal to the world discount factor, do
not alter its most important implications.  If, however, the constant world interest rate
assumption is relaxed, the analysis becomes somewhat more complicated.  In this case
the current account deficit will be fundamentally affected by the country’s net foreign
assets position, and by the relationship between the world interest rate and its
“permanent” value, rt*.  With a variable world interest rate, equation (1) becomes:
(3)  CADt = (Yt* - Yt) – (It* - It) – (Gt – Gt*) –  (rt* - rt) Bt - ξ  t,
where Bt is the country’s net foreign asset position.  If the residents of this country are net
holders of foreign assets, Bt >0.
5  ξ  t is a consumption adjustment factor that arises form
the fact that the world discount factor is not any longer equal to the consumers’
subjective discount factor.  Notice that under most plausible parameter values, ξ  t  is
rather small (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).  An important implication of equation (3) says
that if the country is a net foreign debtor (B t < 0), and the world interest rate exceeds its
permanent level the current account deficit will be higher.
A number of versions of optimizing models of the current account have appeared
in the literature since the 1980s.  Razin and Svensson (1983), for example, built an
optimizing framework to explore the validity of the Laursen-Metzler-Harberger condition
developed in the 1950s, and concluded that the insights form these early models were
largely valid in a fully optimizing, two period, general equilibrium model.  Edwards and
van Wijnbergen (1986) explored the current account implications of alternative speeds of
trade liberalization.  They found out that in a framework where the country in question
faced a borrowing constraint, a gradual liberalization of trade was preferred to a cold-
turkey approach.  Frenkel and Razin (1987) analyzed the way in which alternative fiscal
policies affected the current account balance through time.  Edwards (1989) introduced
nontradable goods, in an effort to understand the connection between the real exchange
rate and the current account through time.  Sheffrin and Woo (1990) used an annuity
framework to develop a number of specific testable hypotheses from the intertemporal
framework.  Gosh and Ostry (1995) tested the intertemporal model using data for a group7
of developing countries.  They argue that, overall, their results adequately capture the
most important features of mocdern optimizing models of the current account.
Numerical simulations based on the intertemporal approach sketched above,
suggest that a country’s optimal response to negative exogenous shocks is to run very
high current account deficits.  These large deficits are, of course, the mechanism through
which the country nationals’ smooth consumption.  An important consequence of this
models’ result is that a small country can accumulate a very large external debt, and will
have to run a sizeable trade surplus in the steady state in order to repay it.  The problem,
however, is that the external accounts and the external debt ratios implied by these
models are not observed in reality. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example, develop a
model of a small open economy with AK technology, and a constant rate of productivity
growth that exceeds world productivity growth.
6  This economy faces a constant world
interest rate r, and no borrowing constraint.  Under a set of plausible parameters, the
steady state trade surplus is equal to 45 percent of GDP, and the steady state debt to GDP
ratio is equal to 15.
7  Needless to say, neither of these figures have been observed in
modern economies (on actual distributions of the current account see the discussion in
Section IV of this paper.)  Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) developed an
intertemporal model of a small economy to analyze the effects of lifting capital controls
on the dynamics of the current account.  The basic version of their model assumes both
tradable and nontradable goods, physical capital and internationally traded bonds, and no
borrowing constraint.  An important feature of the model – and one that sets it apart from
that of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) discussed above --, is that the rate of technological
progress is equal to that of the rest of the world.  The authors calibrate the model for the
case of Spain, and find that the optimal response to a financial reform is to run a current
account deficit that peaks at 60% of GDP.
8   As the authors themselves acknowledge, this
figure tends to contradict strongly what is observed in reality. Following the financial
liberalization reform, Spain’s current account deficit peaked at 3.4% of GDP.
                                                                                                                                                                            
5   See Obstfeld abd Rogoff (1996).
6   Small means that the cost of borrowing does not rise with the qiantity.
7   Ostfeld and Rogoff (1996) do not claim that this model is particularly realistic.  In fact, they present its
implications to highlight some of the shortcomings of simple intertemporal models of the current account.
8   Their analysis is carried on in terms of the trade account balance.  In this model there are no differences
between the trade and current account balances.8
The fact that these models predict optimal levels of the current account deficit that
are an order of magnitude higher than those observed in the real world poses a important
challenge for economists.  A number of authors have tried to deal with these disturbing
results by introducing adjustment costs and other type of rigidities into the analysis.
Blanchard (1983), for example, developed a current account model with investment
installation costs to investigate the dynamics of debt and the current account in a small
developing economy, such as Brazil.  A simulation of this model for feasible parameter
values indicated that a country with Brazil’s characteristics should accumulate foreign
debt in excess of 300% of its GNP.  Moreover, according to this model, in the steady
state the country in question should run a trade surplus equal to 10 percent of GDP.
Although these numbers are not as extreme as those obtained from simple models
without rigidities, they are quite implausible, and are not usually observed in the real
world. Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) introduced a series of extensions to their
basic model in an effort to generate more plausible simulation results.  They showed that
it was not possible to improve the results by simply imposing a greater degree of
curvature into the production possibility frontier.  They also show that by assuming costly
and slow factor mobility across sectors they could generate current account deficits in
their simulation exercises that were  more modest – although still very high from a
historical perspective. More recently, a number of authors have developed models with
borrowing constraints in an effort to generate current account paths that are closer to
reality.
II.2.2  Policy Interpretations of the Intertemporal Approach
An important policy implication of the intertemporal perspective is that policy
actions that result in higher investment opportunities will, necessarily, generate a
deterioration in the country’s current account.  According to this view, however, this type
of worsening of the current account balance should not be a cause for concern or for
policy action.  This reasoning led Sachs (1981, p. 243) to argue that the rapid increase in
the developing countries foreign debt in the 1978-1981 period was not a sign of increased
vulnerability.  It is interesting to quote Sachs extensively:9
“The manageability of the LDC debt has been the subject of a large literature in
recent years.  If my analysis is correct, much of the growth in LDC debt reflects
increased in investment and should not pose a problem of repayment.  The major
borrowers have accumulated debt in the context of rising or stable, but not
falling, saving rates.  This is particularly true for Brazil and Mexico…” (Sachs
1981, p. 243.  Emphasis added).
This view was also endorsed by Robischek (1981), one of the most senior and influential
IMF officials during the 1970s and 1980s.  Commenting on Chile’s situation in 1981 – a
time when the country’s current account deficit surpassed 14% of GDP --, he argued that
to the extent that the public sector accounts were under control and that domestic savings
were increasing, there was absolutely no reason to worry about major current account
deficits.  As it turned out, however, shortly after Robischek expressed his views, Chile
entered into a deep financial crisis that ended up with a major devaluation, the
bankruptcy of the banking sector, and a GDP decline of 14%.
9  The argument that a large
current account deficit is not a cause of concern if the fiscal accounts are balanced has
been associated with former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, and has become
to be known as Lawson’s Doctrine.
The respected Australian economist Max Corden has possibly been the most
articulate  exponent of the intertemporal policy view of the current account. In an
important article, titled “Does the Current Account Matter?”, Corden (1994) makes a
distinction between the “old” and “new” views on the current account.  According to the
former, “a country can run a current account deficit for a limited period.  But no positive
deficit is sustainable indefinitely.” (Corden 1994, p. 88).  The “new” view, on the other
hand, makes a distinction between deficits that are the result of fiscal imbalances and
those that respond to private sector decisions. According to the new view,
 “[A]n increase in the current account deficit that results from a shift in private
sector behavior – a rise in investment or a fall in savings – should not be a matter
of concern at all (Corden 1994, p. 92, emphasis added).”
                                                          
9   See Edwards and Edwards (1991) for details.10
The eruption of the debt crisis in 1982 suggested that some of the more important
policy implications of the new (intertemporal) view of the current account were subject to
important flaws.  Indeed, some of the countries affected by this crisis had run very large
current account deficits in the presence of increasing investment rates, and/or balanced
fiscal accounts.  In that regard he case of Latin America is quite interesting.  With the
exception of oil-producer Venezuela, current account deficits skyrocketed in 1981.  This
was the case in countries with increasing investment, such as Brazil and Mexico, as well
as in countries with a balanced fiscal sector and rising investment, such as Chile.
II.3 Views on the Current Account in the Post 1982 Debt Crisis Period
In light of the debt crisis of 1982, a number of authors explicitly moved away
from the implications of the Lawson Doctrine, and argued that large current account
deficits were often a sign of trouble to come, even if domestic savings were high and
increasing.  Fischer (1988) made this point forcefully in an article on real exchange rate
overvaluation and currency crises:
“The primary indicator [of a looming crisis] is the current account deficit.  Large
actual or projected current account deficits – or, for countries that have to make
heavy debt repayments, insufficiently large surpluses --, are a call for
devaluation.” (p. 115).
An important point raised by Fischer was that what matters is not whether there is a large
deficit, but whether the country in question is running an “unsustainable” deficit.  In his
words, “if the current account deficit is ‘unsustainable’…or if reasonable forecasts show
that it will be unsustainable in the future, devaluation will be necessary sooner or later.”
(p.115).  In the aftermath of the 1990s crises, and as will be discussed in Section III of
this paper, the issue of current account sustainability moved decisively to the center of
the policy debate.  In the years immediately following the 1982 debt crisis, Cline (1988)
also emphasized the importance of current account deficits, as did Kamin (1988, p. 14),
whose extensive empirical work suggested that the trade and current accounts11
“deteriorated steadily through the year immediately prior to devaluation.”  In their
analysis of the Chilean crisis of 1982 Edwards and Edwards (1991) argued that Chile’s
experience – where a 14% current account deficit was generated by private sector-
induced capital inflows --, showed that the Lawson Doctrine was seriously flawed.
II.4  The Surge of Capital Inflows in the 1990s, the Current Account and the Mexican
Crisis
During much of the 1980s the majority of the developing countries were cut from
the international capital markets, and either run current account surpluses or small
deficits.  This was even the case for the so-called “East Asian Tigers,” which had not
been affected by the debt crisis.  Indeed, between 1982 and 1990 Hong Kong, Korea and
Singapore posted current account surpluses, while Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand run moderate deficits – Indonesia and Thailand deficits were the highest in
the group, averaging 3.2 % of GDP.
Starting in 1990, however, a large number of emerging countries were able, once
again, to attract private capital.  This was particularly the case in Latin America, where
by 1992 the net volume of funds had become so large {{ exceeding 35 percent of the
region’s exports {{ that a number of analysts began to talk about Latin America’s
“capital inflows problem” (Calvo et al 1993;  Edwards 1993). Naturally, the counterpart
of these large capital inflows was a significant widening in capital account deficits, as
well as a rapid accumulation of international reserves.  During the first half of the 1990s,
and in the midst of international capital abundance, there was a resurgence of Lawson’s
Doctrine in some policy circles.  This was particularly the case in analyses of the
evolution of the Mexican economy during the years preceding the peso crisis of 1994-95.
In 1990 the international financial markets rediscovered Mexico, and large amounts of
capital began flowing into the country.  As a result, Mexico could finance significant
current account deficits -- in 1992-94 they averaged almost 7% of GDP.  When some
analysts pointed out that these deficits were very large, the Mexican authorities
responded by arguing that, since the fiscal accounts under control, there was no reason to
worry.  In 1993 the Bank of Mexico maintained that:12
“...the current account deficit has been determined exclusively by the private
sector’s decisions...Because of the above and the solid position of public finances,
the current account deficit should clearly not be a cause for undue concern. (p.
179-80, emphasis added)”
In his recently published memoirs former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (2000),
argues that the very large current account deficit was not a cause of the December 1994
crisis.  According to him, two of the most influential cabinet members – Secretary of
Commerce Jaime Serra and Secretary of Programming, and future president, Ernesto
Zedillo -- pointed out in the early 1990s that, since the public sector was in equilibrium,
Mexico’s large current account deficit was harmless.
10
Not everyone, however, agreed with this position. In the 1994 Brookings Panel
session on Mexico, Stanley Fischer argued that:
“[t]he Mexican current account deficit is huge, and it is being financed largely by
portfolio investment.  Those investments can turn around very quickly and leave
Mexico with no choice but to devalue…And as the European and especially the
Swedish experiences show, there may be no interest rate high enough to prevent
an outflow and a forced devaluation” (1994, p. 306).
The World Bank staff expressed concern about the widening current account
deficit. In Trends in Developing Economies 1993, the Bank staff said:  “In 1992 about
two-thirds of the widening of the current account deficit can be ascribed to lower private
savings…If this trend continues, it could renew fears about Mexico’s inability to generate
enough foreign exchange to service debt…” (World Bank 1993, p. 330).
II.5  Views on the Current Account in the Post 1990s Currency Crashes
In the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994, a large number of analysts
maintained, once again, that Lawson’s Doctrine was seriously flawed.  In an address to
the Board of Governors of the Interamerican Development Bank, Larry Summers (1996,
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p.46), then the US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, was extremely explicit when he said
“current account deficits cannot be assumed to be benign because the private sector
generated them.”  This position was also been taken by the IMF in post-mortems of the
Mexican debacle.  In evaluating the role of the Fund during the Mexican crisis, the
Director of the Western Hemisphere Department and the Chief of the Mexico Division
wrote:  “large current account deficits, regardless of the factors underlying them are
likely to be unsustainable (Loser and Williams, 1997, p 268).  According to Secretary
Summers “close attention should be paid to any current account deficit in excess of 5% of
GDP, particularly if it is financed in a way that could lead to rapid reversals.”
Whether “large” current account deficits were in fact a central cause behind the
East Asian debacle continues to be a somewhat controversial issue. After analyzing the
available evidence, in a recent comprehensive study Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998)
analyzed the period leading to the East Asian crisis, and argue that there is some support
for the position that large current account deficits were one of the principal factors behind
the crisis.  According to them, “as a group, the countries that came under attack in 1997
appear to have been those with large current account deficits throughout the 1990s.
(emphasis in the original, p. 7).”  And then, they add in a rather guarded way, “prima
facie evidence suggests that current account problems may have played a role in the
dynamics of the Asian meltdown (p. 8).”  Radelet and Sachs (2000) have also argued that
large current account deficits were an important factor behind the crisis. And,
commenting on the eruption of the crisis in Thailand the Chase Manhatan Bank (1997)
also argued that large current account deficits had been a basic cause behind the crises.
A close analysis of the data shows, however, that with the exceptions of Malaysia and
Thailand the current account deficits were not very large.  Take for instance the 1990-96
period: for the five East Asia crisis countries the deficit exceeded the arbitrary 5%
threshold in only 12 out of 35 possible times.  The frequency of occurrence is even lower
for the two years preceding the crisis:  3 out of 10 possible times (Edwards 1999).
In view of the (perceived) limited importance of the current account, many
authors have developed crisis models where the current account deficit is not central. In
Calvo (2000), for example, a currency crisis responds to financial fragilities in the
country in question and is independent of the current account.  A particularly important14
fragility is the mismatch between the maturity of banks’ assets and obligations. Chang
and Velasco (2000) have developed a series of models where a crisis is the result of self-
fulfilling expectations.  A somewhat different line of research has emphasized the role of
borrowing constraints.  In this setting the nationals of the country in question cannot
borrow as much as they wish from the international financial market; an upward sloping
supply for foreign funds limits their ability to smooth consumption.  An appealing feature
of this type of models is that the optimal current account deficit does not take the
implausible values generated by the small country models discussed above.  Moreover, in
borrowing constraints models, changes in the level of the borrowing constraint –
generated by changes in the lender’s expectations, for example -- can indeed result in
currency crises. A good example is Atkenson and Rios-Rull (1996) model of a credit-
constrained country.  In this setting current account problems may arise even if fiscal and
monetary policies are consistent; all it takes is that investors’ perceptions change.
An important consequence of the 1990s currency crushes was that market
participants, and in particular private investors, became concerned with the evolution of
emerging nations’ current account balances.  This has been translated in formal efforts to
develop models of current account “sustainability.”  The issue at hand has been
succinctly put by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996) as follows:  “What persistent level of
current account deficits should be considered sustainable?  Conventional wisdom is that
current account deficits above 5% of GDP flash a red light, in particular if the deficit is
financed with short-term debt…”
III.  How Useful are Models of Current Account Sustainability?
  As mentioned in the preceding section, in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis
many analysts argued that the so-called “new” view of the current account – based on
Lawson’s Doctrine --  was seriously flawed.  While some, such as Bruno (1995), argued
that large deficits stemming from higher investment (as in East Asia) were not
particularly dangerous, others maintained that any deficit in excess of a certain threshold
– say, 4% of GDP – was a cause for concern.  Partially motivated by this debate, Milesi-
Ferreti and Razin (1996) developed a framework to analyze current account
sustainability.  Their main point that the “sustainable” level of the current account was15
that level consistent with solvency.  This, in turn, means the level at which “the ratio of
external debt to GDP is stabilized (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 1998).”  Analyses of current
account sustainability have become particularly popular among investment banks.  For
instance, Goldman-Sachs GS-SCAD Model developed in 1997 has become popular
among analysts interested in assessing emerging nations’ vulnerability.  More recently,
Deutsche Bank (2000) has developed a model of current account sustainability both to
analyze whether a particular country’s current account is “out of line,” and to evaluate the
appropriateness of its real exchange rate.
  The basic idea behind sustainability exercises is captured by the following simple
analysis.  As pointed out, solvency requires that the ratio of the (net) international
demand for the country’s liabilities (both debt and non-debt liabilities) stabilizes at a
level compatible with foreigners’ net demand for these claims on future income flows.
Under standard portfolio theory, the net international demand for country j liabilities can
be written as:
 
(4)  δ  j = α  j  ( W - W j ) - ( 1 - α  jj ) W j ; 
  where α  j  is the percentage of world’s wealth (W) that international investors are willing
to hold in the form of country j’s assets; W j  is country j’s wealth (broadly defined), and
α  jj   is country’s j asset allocation on its own assets.  The asset allocation shares α  j  and
α  jj , depend, as in standard portfolio analyses, on expected returns and perceived risk.
Assuming that country’s j wealth is a multiple λ  of its (potential or full employment)
GDP, and that country’s j wealth is a fraction β  j  of world’s wealth W, it is possible to
write the (international) net demand for country’s j assets as:
11
 
  (5) δ  j = {α  j   θ  j   -   ( 1 - α  jj ) } λ  jj Y j ; 
 
  where, Y j  is (potential) GDP, and θ  j  =  ( 1 -  β  j ) /  β  j .  Denoting, [{α  j   θ  j   -   ( 1 - α  jj
) } λ  jj ] =  γ  *j ,  then,
                                                          
11 This expression will hold for every period t;  I have omitted the subscript t in order to economize on
notation.16
 
  (6) δ  j =    γ  *j  Y j .
  Equation (6) simply states that, in long run equilibrium, the net international demand for
country j assets, can be expressed as a proportion γ  *j  of the country’s (potential or
sustainable) GDP.  The determinants of the factor of proportionality are given by (3) and,
as expressed, include relative returns and perceived risk of country j, and other
countries.
12
  In this framework, and under the simplifying assumption that international
reserves don’t change, the “sustainable” current account ratio is given by:
13
 
  (7) ( C/Y ) j = { g  j + π * j ) [{α  j   θ  j   -   ( 1 - α  jj ) } λ  jj ], 
  where g  j  is the country’s sustainable rate of growth, and  π * j is a valuation factor
(approximately) equal to international inflation.
14 Notice that if {α  j   θ  j   -   ( 1 - α  jj ) }<
0, domestic residents’ demand for foreign liabilities exceed foreigners’ demand for the
country’s liabilities.  Under these circumstances the country will have to run a current
account surplus in order to maintain a stable (net external) liabilities to GDP ratio.
Notice that according to (4) there is no reason for the  “sustainable” current account
deficit to be the same across countries.  In fact, that would only happen by sheer
coincidence.  The main message of (4) is that “sustainable” current account balances vary
across countries and depend on whatever variables affect portfolio decisions, and
economic growth.  In other words, the notion that no country can run a sustainable deficit
in excess of 4%, 5% of GDP, or any other arbitrary number is nonsense.
  Using a very similar framework to the one developed above, Goldman-Sachs has
made a serious effort to actually estimate long run sustainable current account deficits for
a number of countries (Ades and Kaune 1997). Using a 25-country data set G-S estimated
                                                          
 
12 The assumptions of constant λ  and θ  are, of course, highly simplifying.
 
13 As a result of this assumption, equation (6) overstates (slightly)  the “sustainable” current account ratio.
 
14 Under the restrictive assumption that international inflation is equal to zero, this expression corresponds
exactly to G-S equation (8). See Ades and Kaune (1997, p6)17
the ratio of external liabilities foreigners are willing to hold  -- γ  *j  in the model sketched
above --, as well as each country’s potential rate of growth.  Table 1 contains G-S’s
estimates of γ  *j, while Table 2 presents their estimates of long run sustainable current
account deficits. In addition to estimating these steady state imbalances, G-S calculated
asymptotic convergence paths towards those long run current accounts.  These are
presented in Table 2, under the heading “short run sustainable balances.” Several
interesting features emerge from these tables.  First, there is a wide variety of estimated
long run “sustainable” deficits.  Second, with the notable exception of China – whose
estimated “sustainable” deficit is an improbable 11% of GDP –, the estimated levels are
very modest, and range from 1.9 to 4.5% of GDP.  Third, although the range for the
“short run sustainable level” is broader, still in very few countries does it exceed 4% of
GDP. Fourth, the estimates of the ratio of each country external liabilities foreigners are
willing to hold  -- γ  *j  in the model sketched above --, exhibit more variability.  Its range
(excluding China) goes from 31.5 to 64.6% of GDP.
  Although this type of analysis represents an improvement with respect to arbitrary
current account thresholds, it is subject to a number of serious limitations, including the
fact that it is exceedingly difficult to obtain reliable estimates for the key variables.  In
particular, there is very little evidence on equilibrium portfolio shares.  Also, the
underlying models used for calculating the long run growth tend to be very simplistic.
  The most serious limitation of this framework, however, is that it does not take
into account, in a satisfactory way, transitional issues arising from changes in portfolio
allocations. These, however, can have a fundamental effect on the way in which the
economy adjusts to changes in the external environment.  For example, the speed at
which a country absorbs surges in foreigners’ demand for its liabilities will have an effect
on the sustainable path of the current account (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2000).
  The key point is that even small changes in foreigners’ net demand for the
country’s liabilities may generate complex equilibrium adjustment paths for the current
account.  These current account movements will be necessary for the new portfolio
allocation to materialize, and will not generate a disequilibrium – or unsustainable –
balance.  However, when this equilibrium path of the current account is contrasted with18
threshold  levels obtained from models such as the one sketched above, analysts could
(incorrectly) conclude that the country is facing a serious disequilibrium.
  In order to illustrate this point, assume that equation (8) captures the way in which
the current account responds to change in portfolio allocations. In this equation  γ *t is the
new desired level (relative to GDP) of foreigners’ (net) desired holdings of the country’s
liabilities;   γ *t-1, on the other hand, is the old desired level.
 
  (8) (C/Y) t = (g + π  *) γ  *t +   β  ( γ *t  - γ * t-1 ) - η  ( (C/Y) t-1   -  (g +  π *) γ *t ), 
 
  where, as before, γ * = [{α  j   θ  j   -   ( 1 - α  jj ) } λ  jj ].  According to this equation short
term deviations of the current account from its long run level can result from two forces.
The first is a traditional stock adjustment term  (γ * t  - γ * t-1), that captures deviations
between the demanded and the actual stock of assets.  If  (γ * t  >* γ  t-1), then the current
account deficit will exceed its long run value. β  is the speed of adjustment, which will
depend on a number of factors, including the degree of capital mobility in the country in
question, and the maturity of its foreign debt.  The second force, which is captured by  - η
( (C/Y) t-1   -  (g +  π *) γ *t ), in equation (7) is a self-correcting term.  This term plays the
role of making sure that in this economy there is, at least, some form of  “consumption
smoothing”.  The importance of this self correcting term will depend on the value of  η  .
If  η  = 0, the self correcting term will play no role, and the dynamics of the current
account will be given by a more traditional stock adjustment equation.  In the more
general case, however, when both  β  and  η   are different from zero, the dynamics of the
current account will be richer, and discrepancies between γ * t and  γ  *t-1 will be resolved
gradually through time.
  As may be seen from (8), in the long run steady state, when (γ * t =  γ  *t-1),  and
(CY)t-1   =  (C/Y), the current account will be at its sustainable level, (g + π  * )  [{α  j   θ  j   -
( 1 - α  jj ) } λ  jj ].  The dynamic behavior for the net stock of the country’s assets in hands
of foreigners, as a percentage of GDP, will be given by equation (9).
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  (9) γ  t = ( γ  t - 1  + (C/Y) t ) / ( 1 + g + π  * ) .
  The implications of incorporating the adjustment process can be illustrated with a
simple example based on the Goldman-Sachs computations presented above.  Notice that
according to the figures in Table 1, by the end of 1996 there was a significant gap
between Goldman-Sachs estimates of foreigners’ desired holdings of Mexican and
Argentine liabilities: while the Mexican ratio stood at 38.3% of the county’s GDP, the
corresponding figure for Argentina was 48.4%.  Assume that for some reason – a
reduction in perceived Mexican country risk, for example – this gap is closed to one half
of it initial level, and that the demand for Mexican liabilities increases to 43% of
Mexican GDP.  Figure 1 presents the estimated evolution of the sustainable current
account path under the assumptions that Mexican growth remains at 5% and that world
inflation is zero – both assumptions made by G-S.  In addition it is assumed that β  = 0.65,
η  = 0.45, and that the increase in γ * is spread over three years.
  The results from this simple exercise are quite interesting: first, as may be seen,
the initial level of the sustainable current account level is equal to 1.9% of GDP, exactly
the level estimated by G-S (see Table 2).  Second, the current account converges to
2.15% of GDP, as suggested by equation (7).  Third, and more important for the analysis
in this section, the dynamics of the current account is characterized by a sizable
overshooting, with the “equilibrium path” deficit peaking at 3.5% of GDP.  If, on the
other hand, it is assumed that the increase in γ * takes place in one period, the equilibrium
deficit would peak at a level in excess of 5%, a figure twice as large as the new long term
sustainable level.  What makes this exercise particularly interesting is that these rather
large overshootings are the result of very small changes in portfolio preferences.  This
strongly suggests that in a world where desired portfolio shares are constantly changing,
the concept of a sustainable equilibrium current account path is very difficult to estimate.
Moreover, this simple exercise indicates that relying on current account ratios – even
ratios calculated using current “sustainability” frameworks – can be highly misleading.
These dynamic features of current account adjustment may explain why so many authors
have failed to find a direct connection between current account deficits and crises.20
  The analysis presented above suggests two important dimensions of adjustment
and crisis prevention.  First, current account dynamics will affect real exchange rate
behavior.  More specifically, current account overshooting will be associated with a
temporary real exchange rate appreciation.  The actual magnitude of this appreciation
will depend on a number of variables, including the income demand elasticity for
nontradables and the labor intensity of the nontradable sector.  In order for this dynamic
adjustment to be smooth, the country should have the ability to implement the required
real exchange rate depreciation in the second phase of the process.  This is likely to be
easier under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a rigid one.  Second, if
foreigners’ (net) demand for the country’s liabilities declines – as is likely to be the case
if there is some degree of contagion, for example –, the required current account
compression will also overshoot.  In the immediate run the country will have to go
through a very severe adjustment.  This can be illustrated by the following simple
example:  assume that as a result of external events – a crisis in Brazil, say – the demand
for Argentine liabilities declines from the level estimated by G-S --48.4% of GDP -- to a
40% of GDP.  While the long run equilibrium current account, as calculated by G-S,
would experience a very modest decline from 2.9% to 2.4% of GDP, in the short run the
adjustment would be drastic. In fact, the simple model developed above suggests that




IV.  Current Account Behavior since the 1970s
In this section I provide a broad analysis of current account behavior in both
emerging and advanced countries.  The section deals with three specific issues:  (1) the
distribution of the current account across regions.  (2) The persistence of high current
account deficits. And (3), a detailed analysis of current account reversals and their costs.
The discussion of the relationship – if any – between current account deficits and
financial crises is the subject of section V.
                                                          
15 This assumes that growth is not affected.  If, as it is likely, it declines the required compression would be
even larger.21
IV.1  The Distribution of Current Account Deficits in the World Economy
In this subsection I use data for 149 countries during 1970-1997 to analyze some
basic aspects of current account behavior.  I am particularly interested in understanding
the magnitudes of deficits through time.  This first look at the data should help answer
questions such as “From a historical point of view, is 4% of GDP a large current account
deficit?”  “Historically, for how long have countries been able to run ‘large’ current
account deficits?”  The data are from the World Bank comparative data set.  However,
when data taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics are used the results
obtained are very similar.  Throughout the analysis I have concentrated on the current
account deficit as a percentage of GDP; that is, in what follows, a positive number means
that the country in question, for that particular year, has run a current account deficit.  In
order to organize the discussion I have divided the data into six regions:  (1)
Industrialized countries; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) Asia; (4) Africa; (5)
Middle East and Northern Africa; and (6) Eastern Europe.  In Table 3 I present the
number of countries in each region and year for which there are data available.  This table
summarizes the largest data set that can be used in empirical work.   As will be specified
later, in some of the empirical exercises I have restricted the data set to countries with
population above half a million people, and income per capita above $ 500 in 1985 PPP
terms.  For a list of the countries included in the analysis see the Appendix.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 contain basic data on current account deficits by region for the
period 1970-1997.  In Table 4 I present averages by region and year.  Table 5 contains
medians, and in Table 6 I present the third quartile by year and region.  I have used the
data on the third quartile presented in this table as cut-off points to define “high deficit”
countries. Later in this section I analyze the persistence of high deficits in each of the six
regions.
A number of interesting features of current account behavior emerge from these
tables. First, after the 1973 oil-shock there were important changes in current account
balances in the industrial nations, the Middle East and Africa.  Interestingly, no
discernible change can be detected in Latin America or Asia.  Second, and in contrast
with the previous point, the 1979 oil shock seems to have affected current account
balances in every region in the world. The impact of this shock was particularly severe in22
Latin America, where the deficit jumped from an average of 3.4% of GDP in 1978 to
over 10% of GDP in 1981.  Third, these Tables capture vividly the magnitude of the
external adjustment undertaken by the emerging economies in the 1980s.  What is
particularly interesting is that, contrary to popular folklore, this adjustment was not
confined to the Latin American region.  Indeed, the nations of Asia and Africa also
experienced severe reductions in their deficits during this period.  Fourth, the
industrialized countries went back to having sustained surpluses only after 1993.  And
fifth, during the most recent period current account deficits have been rather modest from
a historical perspective.  This has been the case in every region, with the important
exception of Eastern Europe.
The data on third quartiles presented in Table 6 show that 25 % of the countries in our
sample had, at one point or another, a current account deficit in excess of 7.22% of GDP.
Naturally, as the table shows, the third quartile differs for each region and year, with the
largest values corresponding to Africa and Latin America.  I use the third quartile data in
Table 6 to define “large current account deficit” countries.  In particular, if during a given
year, a particular country’s deficit exceeds its region’s third quartile, I classify it as being
a “high deficit country.”
16  An important policy question is how persistent are high
deficits?  I deal with this issue in Table 7, where I have listed those countries that have
had a “high current account deficit” for at least five years in a row.  The results are quite
interesting, and indicate that a rather small number of countries experienced very long
periods of high deficits.  In fact, I could detect only 11 countries with “high deficits” for
ten or more years.  Of these, five are in Africa, three are in Asia and, surprisingly
perhaps, only two are in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Interestingly enough,
Australia and New Zealand are among the very small group of countries with a streak of
high current account deficits in excess of ten years.  In the subsection that follows I will
analyze some of the most important characteristics of deficits reversals.
IV.4  Current Account Reversals:  How Common, How Costly?
In this subsection I provide an analysis of current account reversals.  In particular
I ask three questions:  First, how common are large current account deficit reversals?
                                                          
16   Notice, however, that the actual cut-off points correspond to fairly large deficits even for the Middle
East Countries.23
Second, from a historical point of view, have these reversals been associated with
currency or financial crashes?  And third, how costly, in terms of economic performance
indicators, have these reversals been?   With respect to this third point, I argue that the
most severe effect of current account reversals on economic performance take place
indirectly, through their impact on investment.  The analysis presented in this subsection
complements the results in a recent important paper by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).
17
I use two alternative definitions of current account reversals:  (1)  Reversal1 is
defined as a reduction in the deficit of at least three percent of GDP in one year.  (2)
Reversal2 is defined as a reduction of the deficit of at least 3% of GDP in a three year
period.  Due to space considerations the results reported here correspond to those
obtained when the Reversal1 definition was used.  However, the results obtained under
the alternative – and less strict – definition Reversal2 where very similar to those
discussed in this subsection.
18
The first question I ask is how common are reversals.  This issue is addressed in
Table 8, where I present tabulations by region, as well as for the complete sample, for the
Reversal1 variable.  As may be seen, for the sample as a whole the incidence of
“reversals” was equal to 16.7% of the yearly episodes.  This reversal occurrence varied
across regions;  not surprisingly, given the definition of reversals, the lowest incidence is
in the industrialized countries (6%).  The two highest regions are Africa and the Middle
East, with 27 and 26 percent of reversals respectively.  Both from a theoretical, as well as
from a policy perspective, it is important to determine whether these reversals are short
lived, or whether they are sustained.  Short-term reversals may be the result of
consumption smoothing, while more permanent ones are likely to be the consequence of
policy-related external adjustments.  I address this issue by asking in how many
“reversal” cases the current account deficit was still lower three years after the reversal
was detected.  The answer is in the two-way tabulation tables presented in Table 9.
19
These results indicate that for the sample as a whole, 45 percent of the “reversals” were
translated into a medium term (three year) improvement in the current account balance.
                                                          
17   My data set, however, is larger that that of Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).
18   These definitions of reversal are somewhat different than those used by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).
19   This Table includes only countries with population greater than half a million people and GDP per
capita above $500.  It also excludes countries whose current account was in surplus.24
The degree of permanency of these reversals varied by region, however.  In the advanced
countries 75% of the reversals were sustained after three years; the smallest percentage
corresponds to the Latin American nations where only 37% of the reversals were
sustained after three years.
In their influential paper, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) analyzed the effects of
current account reversals on economic performance, and in particular on GDP growth.
They relied on two methods to address this issue: They first used a “before and after”
approach, and tentatively conclude that “reversals in current account deficits are not
necessarily associated with domestic output compression.” (page 302).   Since “before
and after” analyses are subject to a number of serious shortcomings, they also address the
issue by estimating a number of multiple regressions on different samples.  Their
dependent variable is the rate of per capita output growth, and the independent variables
include a measure of exchange rate overvaluation, an index of openness, the level of
indebtedness, initial GDP and the investment to GDP ratio, among other.  After analyzing
the results obtained from this regression analysis the authors argue that “reversals…are
not systematically associated with a growth slowdown.”  (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 2000,
p. 303).
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) reach this conclusion after estimating growth
equations that control for investment (among other variables).  It is highly probable,
however, that current account reversals affect investment itself, and that through this
channel they impact on real GDP growth.  The reason for this potential effect of reversals
is rather simple: investment is financed by the sum of national and foreign savings.  The
latter, of course, is exactly equal to the current account deficit.  Thus, any current account
reversal will imply a reduction in foreign savings.  What will happen to aggregate savings
– and thus, to investment – will depend on the relationship between foreign and national
savings.  The existing empirical evidence on this matter strongly suggests that foreign
savings partially, and only partially, crowd out domestic savings.  Edwards (1996), for
example, estimated a number of private savings equations for developing countries, and
found that the coefficient of the current account deficit was significant and in the
neighborhood of –0.4.  Loayza et al (2000) used a new data set on private savings in
emerging economies, and estimated that the coefficient of the current account deficit was25
–0.33 and highly significant.  These results, then, suggest that a decline in foreign savings
– that is, a lower current account deficit – will reduce aggregate savings and, thus,
aggregate investment.  Since there is ample evidence supporting the idea that investment
has a positive effect on growth, the previous argument would suggest that, in contrast
with Milesi-Ferreti and Razin’s (2000) claim, current account reversals will have a
negative – albeit indirect -- effect on growth.
In order to whether indeed current account reversals have affected aggregate
investment negatively, I estimated a number of investment equations using panel data for
a large number of countries for the period 1970-1997.  The recent empirical literature on
investment, including Attanasio et al (2000), indicates that investment exhibits a strong
degree of persistence through time.  This suggests estimating equations of the following
type:
20
(10)  INVGDP t j =  β  INVGDP t-1  j + δ  GOVCONS t j  + φ  TRADE_OPENNESS t j
+ γ  REVERSAL t j + ω  t j.
Where INVGDP is the investment to GDP ratio, GOVCONS is the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP, and TRADE_OPENNESS is an index that captures the degree of
openness of the economy.  And REVERSAL is a variable that takes the value of one if
the country in question has been subject to a current account reversal, and zero
otherwise.
21  Finally, ω  is an error term, which takes the following form:
ω  t j = ε  j + µ  t j ,
where ε  j is a country specific error term, and µ  t j is an iid disturbance with the standard
characteristics.
The estimation of equation (10) presents two problems. First, it is well known
from early work on dynamic panel estimation by Nerlove (1971) that if the error contains
                                                          
20  On recent attempts to estimate investment equations using a cross section of countries see, for example,
Barro and Sala-I-Marti (1995), and Attanasio et al  (2000).
21   In principle, the log of initial GDP may also be included.  However, because of the panel nature of the
data, and given the estimation procedures used this is not possible.26
a country specific term, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable will be biased
upward.  There are several ways of handling this potential problem.  Possibly the most
basic approach is using a fixed-effect model, where a country dummy (hopefully) picks
up the effect of the country specific disturbance.  A second way is to estimate the
instrumental variables procedure recently proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for
dynamic panel data.  This method consists of differentiating the equation in question –
equation (10) in our case --, in order to eliminate the country specific disturbance ε  j.  The
differenced equation is then estimated using instrumental variables, where the lagged
dependent variable (in levels), the predetermined variables (also in levels), and the first
differences of the exogenous variables are used as instruments.  In this paper I report
results from the estimation of equation (10) using both a fixed effect procedure as well as
the Arellano and Bond method.
A second problem in estimating equation (10) is that, since current account
reversals are not drawn from a random experiment, the REVERSAL j t dummy is possibly
correlated with the error term.  Under these circumstances the estimated coefficients in
equation (10) will be biased and misleading.  In order to deal with this problem I follow
the procedure recently suggested by Heckman et al (1997, 1998) for estimating
“treatment interventions” models.  This procedure consists of estimating the equation in
question using observations that have a common support for both the treated and the non-
treaded.  In the case at hand, countries that experience a reversal are considered to be
subject to the “treatment intervention.” From a practical point of view, a two steps
procedure is used:  (1) The conditional probability of countries facing a reversal – this is
called the propensity score -- is first estimated using a probit regression.  (2) The
equation of interested is estimated using only observations whose estimated probability
of reversal fall within the interval of estimated probabilities for countries with actual
reversals.  I follow the Heckman et al (1997, 1998) sample correction both for the fixed
effect and the Arellano and Bond procedures.  In estimating the propensity scores I used a
panel data probit procedure, and included as regressors the level of the current account
deficit in the previous period, the level of the fiscal deficit, domestic credit creation, and
time specific dummies.  The results obtained from this first step are not presented here
due to space consideration, but are available on request.  Table 10 contains the results of27
estimating investment equation (10) on an un-balanced panel of 128 countries for period
1971-1997.  In Table 10.a I present the results obtained from the estimation of the
Arellano-Bond instrumental variables procedure.  In Table 10.b I present the results from
the fixed effect estimation.  In both cases I have introduced the REVERSALS indicator
both contemporaneously, as well as with a one period lag.  In the Arellano-Bond
estimates the standard errors have been computed using White’s robust procedure that
corrects for heteroskedasticity.   The results obtained are quite interesting.  In both panels
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is relatively high, capturing the presence
of persistence.  Notice, however, that the coefficient is significantly smaller when the
Arellano-Bond procedure is used.  The coefficient of GOVCON is positive and non
significant.  The estimated coefficient of trade openness is significant and positive,
indicating that after controlling for other factors, countries with a more open trade sector
will tend to a higher investment to GDP ratio.  More important for this paper, the
coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged reversal indicator are significantly
negative, with very similar point estimates. Interestingly, when the REVERSAL variable
was added with a two-year lag its estimated coefficient was not significant at
conventional levels.
In order to check for the robustness of these results I also estimated equation (10)
using alternative samples and definitions of current account reversals.  The results
obtained provide a strong support to those resulted here, and indicate that indeed current
account reversals have affected economic performance negatively through the investment
channel.  An important question is whether the compression in investment is a result of
private or public sector behavior.  An analysis undertaken on a smaller (44 countries)
sample suggests, although both private and public sector investment are negatively
affected by current account reversals, the impact is significantly higher on private
investment.  According to these estimates, available from the author, a current account
reversals results in a decline in private investment equal to 1,8% of GDP;  the long term
reduction of public sector investment is estimated to be, on average, 0.5% of GDP.
An important question is whether current account reversals have affected
economic growth through other channels.  I investigated this issue by using the large data
set to estimate a number of basic growth equations of the following type.28
(11)       GROWTH t j =  β  INVGDP t  j + δ  GOVCONS t j  + φ  TRADE_OPENNESS t j
+ θ  LOGGDPO j + γ  REVERSAL t j + ξ  t j.
W             here GROWTH t j is growth of GDP per capita in country j during year t, and
LOGGDPO j is the initial level of GDP (1970) for country j. As Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1995) have pointed out, the coefficient of GOVCONS is expected to be negative, while
that of openness is expected to be positive.  If there is a catching-up in growth, we would
expect that the estimated coefficient of the logarithm of 1970 GDP per capita will be
negative.  The main interest of this analysis is the coefficient of REVERSAL.  If sharp
and large reductions in the current account deficit have a negative effect on investment,
we would expect the estimated γ  to be significantly negative.  The error ξ  t j is assumed to
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Equation (12) was estimated using the feasible generalized least squares procedure
(FGLS) suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) for unbalanced panels.  The samples in the
different estimations were determined by the availability of data on the different
regressors.  The data were obtained from the World Bank and from the Summer and
Hestons data set.  In the base estimates I used the definition of current account reversals
given by Reversal1 above.  The basic results obtained from the estimation of equation
(11) are presented in Table 11.  In addition to the regressors in equation (11) I introduced
time specific dummy variables. As may be seen from the Table, the results obtained
support the hypothesis that current account reversals have had a negative effect on GDP29
per capita growth, even after controlling by investment.  Moreover, the coefficients for
the other variables in the regression have the expected signs, and are significant at
conventional levels.  When alternative estimation techniques were used, including fixed
effects, the results obtained were very similar.
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V.  Current Account Deficits and Financial Crises:  How Strong is the Link?
As was pointed out in section II of this paper, a large number of recent empirical
studies have been unable to find a strong and significant connection between large
current account deficits and financial crisis (Frankel and Rose, 1996).  And yet, much of
the policy literature – both from investment banks and from the multilateral institutions --
insists on arguing that large deficits have been at the center of recent crises.  In this
section I address this issue by analyzing in some detail the evidence on financial crises in
a large cross section of countries.  The section is organized as follows:  In subsection V.1
I deal with the definition of crisis.  In section V.2 I provide some preliminary evidence on
the connection between current account reversals and crises, as well as between high
current account deficits and crises.  In this analysis I use statistical methods borrowed
from the epidemiology literature.  Finally, in subsection V.3 I provide some empirical
results, obtained using econometric techniques, on the relationship between large current
account deficits and financial crises.  I argue that whether one finds a connection depends
largely on three factors:  (1) the definition of crisis; (2) the sample considered; and (3) the
lag structure used in the analysis.
V.1  Defining a Crisis
Paul Krugman has recently said that “there is no generally accepted formal
definition of a currency crisis, but we know them when we see them. (Krugman 2000, p.
1).”  While some authors, including myself in Edwards (1989) and Edwards and
Santaella (1993), have defined a currency crisis as a very significant depreciation of the
currency – see also Frankel and Rose, 1996; Milesi-Ferreti and Razin, 2000 --, others
have defined a crisis as a situation where a country’s currency is depreciated and/or its
international reserves are seriously depleted (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1996,
                                                          
22 Naturally, when fixed effects are used it is not possible to include (the log of) initial GDP as a regressor.30
Goldstein et al. 2000).  In this paper, and in order to cast a very wide net in the empirical
analysis, I have used two alternative criteria for defining crises.
The first definition follows Frankel and Rose (1996), and defines a currency crisis as
a situation where there is a currency depreciation of at least 25%, that is also a 10%
increase in the rate of depreciation.  I call this variable aevent.
23  The second definition is
broader, and includes as crises situations where the country in question has experienced a
large depreciation, or has experienced a significant loss in reserves.  In constructing this
variable – which I call acrisis – I followed a three steps procedure:
(1) I created a weighted average index of monthly rate of change of the exchange rate
( e e/ ∆ ), and of reserves ( R R/ ∆ ), such as both components of the index have equal
sample volatility: ) / ( * ) / ( / R R e e I R e t ∆ − ∆ = σ σ .
(2)  I define a crisis ( t C ) to have taken place when the index exceed the mean of the
index plus 3 standard deviations:
otherwise










(3) I annualized the crisis index, by considering each year as a June-June period. In other
words, a year “t” is assigned a crisis (=1), if any month between June of year “t” and
June of year “t+1” is a crisis.
As Milesi-Ferreeti and Razin (2000) have pointed out, results from crisis analyses
may be affected by the treatment of currency upheaval in consecutive years.  In order to
address this issue, I defined two additional crisis indicators that exclude adjacent “crises.”
These indicators consider a three-year window after each crisis:  aevent2  is the three-
year window corresponding to aevent, and acrisis2 is the corresponding indicator for
acrisis.
How frequent have currency crises been, according to these indicators,? This is
addressed in Table 12, where I present tabulations for the four indexes for the complete
sample.  As may be seen, the frequency of “crises” goes from 4% to 11% of the country-31
year observations.  In terms of the distribution across regions – the results are not
presented in detail due to space considerations --, according to both aevent indicators
crises have had a higher frequency in Eastern Europe;  the lowest frequency is in the
industrialized nations, with no crises recorded.  The acrisis records a frequency at
approximately 10% in Latin America, Asia and Africa; the acrisis2 index shows that the
highest frequency of crises has been in Africa with a 13.7% frequency of occurrence .
VI.2 Current Account Reversals and Crises:  A Preliminary Analysis
An important finding from the preceding analysis is that current account reversals
are common and quite frequent.  Countries in every region tend to run deficits that
occasionally exceed their long run sustainable level.  This means that, as documented
above, at some point the country has to go through an adjustment process where the
current account deficit is reversed and moves closer to its long run equilibrium.  From a
policy perspective it is important to understand whether current account reversals are
related to currency crises.  In order to address this issue I followed a case-control
methodology.
24  This approach consists of formally testing – using a χ
2 statistic --
whether there is a significant relationship between a particular outcome (the case) and
another variable to which both case and control variables have been “exposed.”  The first
step in applying this approach, then, is to separate observations into a “case group” and a
“control group.”  Countries that for a given year experienced a “crisis” are considered to
be a “case.” Non crisis observations constitute the “control group.”  The second step
consists of calculating how many observations in both the case and control groups have
been subject to a current account reversal.  From this information an odds ratio is
computed, and a χ
2 test is computed in order to determine whether the odds ratio is
significantly different from 1.  If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then there is
evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries that are subject to a reversal, have a
significant probability of experiencing a crisis.
                                                                                                                                                                            
23   The index was constructed on monthly data.  In order to annualize it I consider June to June years.
24   This approach is used frequently by epidemiologists.  I became interested in statistical techniques used
by epidemiologists in doing research on financial  crisis contagion across countries.  See Edwards (2000).
See Fleiss (1981) for details on the actual case-control method.32
The computation of the χ
2 test statistic using contemporaneous values of crisis
and reversals results in the rejection of the null hypothesis that reversal countries are
associated with a crisis.  This result holds for all four definitions of crisis.  The p-values
of the χ
2 tests are on the order of 0.6, or higher.  This result is consistent with the
conclusions reached through a less formal analysis, and using a smaller data set, by
Milessi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).
A possible limitation of a simple application of this χ 2 test, however, is that from
a theoretical point of view the relationship between reversals and crisis implies complex
timing and causality issues.  In fact, there are reasons to believe that reversals may occur
at the same time as a crisis, before a crisis, or even after a “crisis.”  For instance, the
reversal may be so pronounced that the country in question has no alternative but to
devalue its currency and/or deplete its international reserves.  There is no reason,
however, why these phenomena would take place at exactly the same time.  Also, the
reversal may be the result, rather than the cause, of a devaluation.  For this reason, I also
asked whether there is statistical evidence that there is a current account reversal in the
“neighborhood” of a crisis.  In order to do this I define a new variable reversaln, that
takes a value of one on the year a reversal was detected, as well as in the previous and
next years.  The results from this second test suggest that it is not possible to reject the
null hypothesis that currency crises occur “in the neighborhood of current account
reversals.”  This is the case for any of the four crises definitions used in this study.  In
Table 13 I present, the results obtained from the computation of these χ 2 statistics when
the aevent definition of crisis was considered as the “case.”  In order to illustrate the
nature of the results I have presented the χ 2 corresponding to two definitions of reversals.
In panel A I used the narrow one year definition of reversal, while in panel 2 the broader
3 year neighborhood definition of reversal is used.  As may be seen, while in Panel A the
χ
2 test is not significant, in Panel B it is highly significant – the p-value is 0.009.
25
Results obtained for the other three definitions of crisis are very similar and are available
from the author on request.33
V.3   Current Account Deficits and Currency Crises:  A Formal Analysis
In a recent and influential paper, Frankel and Rose (1996) empirically analyzed
the determinants of currency crashes.  Their data set included 105 countries for the period
1970-1991, and their definition of crisis was confined to devaluations in excess of 25%.
26
The results from their probit regression analysis indicated that a number of variables were
good predictors of a currency crash.  These included the fraction of the debt obtained in
concessional terms, the FDI to GDP ratio, the reserves to imports ratio, the rate of growth
of domestic credit, the country’s rate of growth, and international interest rates.  In terms
of the present paper, what is particularly interesting is that in Frankel and Rose (1996) the
current account deficit was not significant, and in many of the regressions it even had the
wrong sign.  This led the authors to conclude in that, “curiously, neither current account
nor government budget deficits appear to play an important role in a typical crash.” (page
365).
27
My own initial analysis of the determinants of crises, using an almost identical
data set, supports the results reported by Frankel and Rose (1996). When a broad sample
and their regressors are used, the current account seems to play no role in major currency
crashes.
28  This is the case independently of the estimation technique used, or on whether
the actual value of the current account deficit or a dummy for high deficits is included as
a regressor.  To my surprise, the incorporation of an independent variable that interacted
the fiscal and current account deficits (the “twin” deficits) did not change the result.
In order to investigate this issue further, and in an effort to determine the
robustness of these results, I followed four avenues of analysis:  First, I inquired whether
the results would hold under alternative data sets.  In particular, I investigated if the
exclusion of particular regions would alter the finding of current account “irrelevancy.”
Second, I considered alternative sets of independent variables in the estimation of probit
equations for crises.  In particular I considered alternative lag structures, and I included
some variables that capture the economic structure of the countries in the sample.  Third,
                                                                                                                                                                            
25   These results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as they are subject to all the limitation of
thus type of case-control analysis, including the fact that no causality can be established.  In this case,
however, I am not particularly interested in causation.
26   See subsection V.1 for a discussion of their definition.
27   This finding is not affected by any of the sensitivity tests undertaken by the authors.
28   By broad sample I mean one that includes all regions in the world.34
I considered alternative definitions of “crisis.”  More specifically, I estimated a number
of probit equations for all four definitions of crisis described in subsection V.1 of this
paper:  aevent, aevent2, acrisis, and acrisis2.  And fourth, I used different estimation
techniques, and considered assumptions regarding the nature of the error term, including
that it takes a random effect form.  Generally speaking, the results obtained were not
affected by the technique used, and for this reason I only report the basic results.
In the estimation of crisis models I used the following regressors:
29  (1)
Percentage of debt in commercial terms; (2) percentage of debt in concessional terms; (3)
percentage of debt at variable rate; (4) percentage of short term debt; (5) FDI; (6) public
sector debt as percentage of GDP;  (7) debt to the multilateral institutions; (8) the ratio of
(gross) international reserves to imports; (9) foreign debt to GDP; (10) the rate of growth
of domestic credit: (11) deviations of the real exchange rate from PPP (a measure of
“overvaluation”; (12) the rate of growth of GDP; (13) the degree of openness of the
economy, measured as imports plus exports over GDP; (14) the ration of government
expenditure to GDP; (15) interest rates in the advanced countries; and (16) the current
account deficit.  All the variables are from the World Bank and , as in the Frankel and
Rose (1996) paper, cover the 1971-1992 period.  With the exception of the crisis indexes,
the trade openness and government consumption, these variables correspond to those
used by Frankel and Rose (1996).
In reporting the regressions, I follow the tradition of presenting the effects of a
unitary change in the independent variables on the probability of a crisis.  In all of the
regressions I report White’s robust standard errors, that correct for heteroskedasticity.
The results obtained when all variables are entered contemporaneously, and all
regions are included are presented in Table 14.  The results are quite interesting and, to a
large extent, in agreement with expectations.  In terms of the current account – the
variable of greatest interest in this paper --, the results show significant differences,
depending on the definition of crisis used.  For both the ACRISIS and ACRISIS2
indicators the estimated coefficient of the current account deficit to GDP is positive and
significant at the 10% level.  On the other hand, when the AEVENT and AEVENT2
                                                          
29   Most, but not all, of these regressors were used by Frankel and Rose (1996).  The results reported here
are not directly comparable to Frankel and Rose (1996), since the data sets are somewhat different.35
currency crash indicators are used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients of
the current account deficits are not significant, and in the case of AEVENT2, it has the
incorrect sign (although it is not significantly different from zero).  Of course, the results
for the EVENTs correspond to the Frankel and Rose (1996) findings discussed above.  In
terms of the other regressors, the results in Table 14 suggest that higher reserves and
higher growth reduce the probability of both types of crisis.  Large FDI plays a
particularly important role in reducing the probability of an event type of crisis.  A high
percentage of debt in commercial terms increases the probability of both types of crisis.
A greater degree of openness reduces the probability under all both crisis definitions.
Notice that in contrast with the Frankel and Rose (1996) results, a higher public deficit
ratio significantly increases the probability of Aevent  type crises.
The results presented in Table 14 were obtained using a data set that covers every
region.  There are, however, important reasons to believe that (most) African countries
have behaved differently during the period under study. This for two reasons:  first,
during the complete period under analysis a large number of African nations belonged to
the CFA currency zone, and were institutionally shielded from devaluations.  Second, it is
well known that during most of this period even non CFA African nations had a great
reluctance to adjust their parity.  This was the case even when the external imbalance was
very large (World Bank 1994). An important question, then, is how will these results be
affected if the African nations are excluded from the sample.  This is done in Table 15,
where probit regressions for our four crisis definitions are presented for a non-Africa
sample.  As may be seen, when this is done, the estimated coefficient of the current
account deficit are positive and significant either at the 5 or 10% level.  It is important to
notice that what makes a difference here is whether Africa is included in the sample or
not.  If instead of focusing on Africa I use GDP per capita as the key variable to split the
sample – as Milessi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) do --, and I only include middle income
countries, the results are not as sharp as those reported in Table 15.
The results presented above, follow Frankel and Rose (1996), and control for a
number of variables, including the external debt ratio, capital flows in the form of FDI
and international reserves.  A problem with including this group of controls, however, is
that it becomes difficult to interpret the current account coefficient in the probit36
regressions.  The reason for this is that we are not allowing the current account deficit to
be financed through the traditional channels: an increase in indebtness and/or a reductioin
in international reserves.  In fact, in the results reported above – as well as in Frankel and
Rose (1996) – higher account deficits are being financed exclusively by an increase in
non-debt generating capital inflows.  It is interesting to understand, however, if an
increase in the current account deficit that is financed by running up the debt and/or
running down international reserves increases the probability of a crisis.  The results in
Table 16, which were obtained when both reserves and debt are not included as controls,
show that an increase in the current account deficit financed by traditional means indeed
increases the probability of an aevent type of  crisis.
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As a final exercise, and in order to analyze the robustness of these results I
investigated whether they held under different lag structures for the regressors.  In
particular I considered the following structure: all debt variables were entered
contemporaneously, as were the structural variables; the country performance and policy
variables were entered with a one period lag.  The results obtained indicate that when this
alternative lag structure is used, the coefficient of the current account deficit remains
positive and significant at conventional levels.  When every regressor is entered with one
lag, the coefficient of the current account deficit remains positive and significant.  In that
case, however, some of the debt variables became non significant.
To sum up, the results presented in this sub-section suggest that the effects of
larger current account deficits on crisis depend on both the definition of crisis and on the
region’s of the world being covered.  More specifically, the results indicate that when the
broader definitions ACRISIS and ACRISIS2 are used, a higher current account deficit
increases  the probability of crisis in the larger sample.  Higher current account deficits
also increase the probability of AEVENT crises significantly when the African nations
are excluded from the sample.
                                                          
30   The resultsa for an acrisis type of crisis are similar and are not reported here due to space
considerations.37
VI.  Concluding Remarks
The main question addressed in this paper is whether the current account
“matters.”  If this question is interpreted very narrowly, in the sense that countries with
an (arbitrarily defined) large current account deficit, almost inevitably face a crisis, then
the answer is “no.”   If, however, it is interpreted more broadly, as suggesting that there
are costs involved in running “very large” deficits, the research reported in this paper
suggests that the answer is a qualified “yes.” 
31
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that large current account deficits
tend not to be persistent.  Very few countries run large deficits for five years in a row,
and only a handful have run large deficits for ten years in a row.  As the analysis in
Section IV of this paper suggests, the typical mechanics of current account deficits is that
countries that experience large imbalances do so for a limited time;  after a while these
imbalances are reduced and a current account reversal is observed.  In section IV I
analyzed in detail the consequences, in terms of economic performance, of current
account reversals using a large (unbalanced) panel of countries for 1970-1997.  Using
recently developed econometric techniques I found that, contrary to what has been
recently suggested, reversals do have a negative effect on economic performance.  They
affect negatively aggregate investment;  moreover, even when I control for investment,
the regression analysis suggests that reversals have a negative impact on GDP growth per
capita.
In section V I addressed the narrower question of whether larger deficits increase
the probability of a country experiencing a currency crisis.  My results suggest that the
answer to this question depends on the definition of crisis, as well as on the sample used
in the analysis.  As the detailed explanation I that section indicate, my results show that
when Africa is excluded – and I argue that there are good reasons for doing it --, an
increase in the deficit raises the probability of a crisis, independently on how this is
defined.  When the complete sample is used, higher deficits increase the probability of
                                                          
31 Naturally, a major challenge in this work is defining what a large deficit means.  In theory large should
mean (significantly) larger than the sustainable level.  In practice, however, and as shown in Section III of
this paper existing sustainability models are not very useful, especially in a dynamic environment.  For this
reason in this paper I have defined a “high deficit” arbitrarily, as a deficit that for that year  exceeds the
third quartile of the deficit distribution for the region to which the country belongs.38
broadly defined crises.  They have no statistical effect on narrowly defined crashes,
however.
In sum, my conclusion is that, in spite of recent claims of the irrelevancy of
current account deficits, the evidence provides a rather strong support for the view that,
from a policy perspective, large deficits should be a cause for concern.  This does not
mean, of course, that every large deficit leads to a crisis; nor does it mean that only when
there is a large current account deficit a crisis can take place.39
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TABLE 1
External world’s Desired Holdings of a Country’s Liabilities (% of GDP)
Country Desired Holding Country Desired Holding
Argentina 48.4 Brazil 38.3
Bulgaria 42.8 Chile 48.4
China 129.2 Colombia 38.3
Czech Republic 31.3 Ecuador 31.3
Hungary 31.3 India 47.2
Indonesia 53.9 Korea 55.4
Malaysia 53.9 Mexico 38.3
Morocco 31.9 Panama 38.3
Peru 48.4 Philippines 57.1
Poland 55.4 Romania 38.3
Russia 38.3 South Africa 38.3




Sustainable Current Account Deficit (SCAD) (% of GDP)
1997 CAD SCAD Steady State SCAD
Argentina 2.7 3.9 2.9
Brazil 4.5 2.9 1.9
Bulgaria -2.6 0.4 2.4
Chile 3.7 4.2 2.9
China -1.4 12.9 11.1
Colombia 4.8 2.6 1.9
Czech Republic 8.6 2.1 1.3
Ecuador 2.0 -0.5 1.3
Hungary 4.0 0.8 1.3
India 1.8 3.8 2.8
Indonesia 3.0 4.0 3.4
Korea 3.8 4.9 3.6
Malaysia 4.1 4.9 3.4
Mexico 1.7 2.1 1.9
Morocco 1.8 0.3 1.3
Panama 6.1 0.8 1.9
Peru 5.1 3.3 2.9
Philippines 4.2 4.5 3.8
Poland 3.8 4.7 3.6
Romania 0.5 2.3 1.9
Russia -2.8 2.5 1.9
South Africa 1.8 3.0 1.9
Thailand 5.4 6.0 4.5
Turkey 1.2 2.1 1.9
Venezuela -4.6 2.2 1.9
Source: Goldman Sachs.46
TABLE 3
Number of Observations per Region Used
In Current Account Analysis
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
year | Industri LatinAme Asia Africa MiddleEa EastEur Total
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 | 855220 2 2
1971 | 965230 2 5
1972 | 1066230 2 7
1973 | 1066230 2 7
1974 | 11 7 7 10 4 1 40
1975 | 18 10 9 18 5 1 61
1976 | 20 17 10 23 8 1 79
1977 | 22 25 11 32 9 1 100
1978 | 22 27 11 36 9 1 106
1979 | 21 29 12 37 9 1 109
1980 | 21 32 13 40 10 3 119
1981 | 22 32 15 41 10 3 123
1982 | 22 32 15 42 10 4 125
1983 | 22 32 15 42 10 4 125
1984 | 22 33 17 42 10 5 129
1985 | 22 33 17 44 10 5 131
1986 | 22 31 17 45 10 5 130
1987 | 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1988 | 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1989 | 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1990 | 22 32 17 46 11 6 134
1991 | 23 32 17 45 10 7 134
1992 | 23 33 18 44 10 13 141
1993 | 23 33 18 44 10 18 146
1994 | 23 33 18 44 11 20 149
1995 | 23 31 18 36 11 20 139
1996 | 23 26 18 28 7 21 123
1997 | 20 17 18 22 7 19 103
|
Total | 550 696 384 910 232 177 2,949
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Computed by the author.47
TABLE 4
Average Current Account to GDP Deficit Ratios
By Region:  1970-1997*
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
year | Industri LatinAme Asia Africa MiddleEa EastEur Total
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 | -0.02 7.59 -0.52 0.92 7.86 2.40
1971 | -0.28 5.59 0.08 5.25 -0.13 1.66
1972 | -1.54 3.86 1.80 6.16 -4.39 0.66
1973 | -1.18 3.40 0.53 7.18 0.61 1.04
1974 | 3.00 3.30 3.55 -3.22 -10.14 1.50 0.24
1975 | 1.49 2.44 2.02 4.72 -9.52 3.52 1.81
1976 | 2.20 1.42 0.81 5.70 -10.59 3.81 1.60
1977 | 1.86 4.09 0.90 3.77 -5.88 5.15 2.26
1978 | 0.52 3.39 2.82 8.62 0.77 1.88 4.28
1979 | 1.43 4.28 3.54 6.51 -8.18 1.54 3.35
1980 | 2.22 7.13 9.40 7.12 -9.02 2.06 5.02
1981 | 2.47 10.15 10.15 10.68 -8.00 3.17 7.30
1982 | 2.41 9.09 9.94 12.38 -1.67 1.46 8.02
1983 | 1.24 6.39 9.52 8.76 1.61 1.47 6.11
1984 | 0.99 4.16 5.83 6.19 1.32 0.40 4.14
1985 | 1.17 2.72 4.67 6.44 1.45 1.54 3.82
1986 | 0.98 5.44 3.60 6.60 1.30 2.80 4.43
1987 | 1.04 5.37 2.24 4.75 1.25 0.17 3.51
1988 | 0.91 4.28 1.65 5.80 0.54 -1.05 3.41
1989 | 1.20 5.28 2.85 4.64 -2.99 0.33 3.24
1990 | 1.18 4.59 2.31 4.51 -4.73 2.96 2.88
1991 | 0.68 7.19 2.56 4.79 n.a. 1.78 6.26
1992 | 0.44 5.47 2.33 6.31 7.90 -0.14 4.17
1993 | -0.45 5.89 5.10 6.75 5.64 1.26 4.46
1994 | -0.35 4.65 3.38 6.47 -0.31 0.91 3.39
1995 | -0.32 4.43 5.07 8.00 -1.63 2.59 3.91
1996 | -0.44 5.29 4.33 8.51 -2.60 6.45 4.56
1997 | -0.66 3.87 3.79 4.57 -3.89 6.51 3.09
|
|
Total | 0.87 5.28 4.12 6.56 -0.40 2.52 4.09
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
* A positive number denotes a current account deficit. A negative
number is a surplus.
Source: Computed by the author from raw data obtained from the World
Bank.48
TABLE 5
Median Current Account to GDP Deficit Ratios
By Region:  1970-1997
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
year | Industri LatinAme Asia Africa MiddleEa EastEur Total
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 | -0.41 4.06 0.94 0.92 7.86 0.86
1971 | -0.51 4.83 1.10 5.25 5.74 1.08
1972 | -1.06 1.70 1.57 6.16 2.88 0.44
1973 | 0.18 1.24 0.77 7.18 5.42 0.95
1974 | 2.94 4.10 3.02 2.39 0.14 1.50 2.97
1975 | 1.34 4.52 3.23 6.56 -2.73 3.52 3.40
1976 | 2.71 1.41 0.62 5.00 -6.65 3.81 3.27
1977 | 2.11 3.80 -0.03 4.24 -3.71 5.15 2.84
1978 | 0.68 3.48 2.74 9.95 3.01 1.88 3.60
1979 | 0.66 4.68 3.73 6.52 -8.89 1.54 3.32
1980 | 2.35 5.59 5.03 8.36 -3.96 4.95 4.66
1981 | 2.73 9.06 5.92 10.09 1.46 2.72 6.58
1982 | 2.02 7.60 5.10 9.85 -1.53 1.88 6.41
1983 | 0.88 4.70 7.18 6.59 5.10 1.48 4.33
1984 | 0.22 3.66 2.12 3.76 4.89 1.43 2.51
1985 | 0.98 2.07 3.13 4.42 2.61 1.51 2.91
1986 | -0.12 2.99 2.42 3.76 2.30 1.93 2.68
1987 | 0.42 4.15 1.34 5.22 3.04 0.76 2.61
1988 | 1.15 2.25 2.68 5.50 2.00 0.72 2.66
1989 | 1.54 4.41 3.35 3.76 -0.39 1.70 2.85
1990 | 1.60 3.00 3.41 3.78 -0.58 3.69 2.83
1991 | 0.91 4.83 3.17 3.64 9.74 0.70 3.02
1992 | 0.86 4.34 1.94 5.65 7.29 0.40 3.01
1993 | 0.55 4.60 4.18 6.81 4.20 1.58 3.18
1994 | -0.37 3.19 4.63 5.65 -0.38 1.39 2.49
1995 | -0.71 3.90 4.91 4.81 -2.14 1.99 2.70
1996 | -0.56 3.97 4.76 4.15 -0.99 4.50 3.28
1997 | -0.57 4.12 3.61 3.71 -2.39 6.29 2.94
|
Total | 0.77 4.12 3.14 5.33 1.95 1.93 3.17
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Computed by the author from raw data obtained from the World
Bank49
TABLE 6
Third Quartile of Current Account to GDP Deficit Ratios
By Region:  1970-1997
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
| group1
year | Industri LatinAme Asia Africa MiddleEa EastEur Total
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 | 0.64 6.86 1.28 1.93 9.85 4.06
1971 | 0.43 7.77 1.74 8.28 9.31 4.55
1972 | 0.30 2.37 3.63 11.96 5.30 2.59
1973 | 1.33 4.12 1.30 9.99 5.81 4.12
1974 | 4.41 10.05 5.61 4.64 14.44 1.50 5.52
1975 | 4.46 6.78 5.06 8.44 13.98 3.52 7.75
1976 | 4.38 4.23 6.19 8.80 4.36 3.81 5.47
1977 | 3.62 7.37 4.49 7.86 2.47 5.15 6.35
1978 | 2.50 7.07 4.80 12.85 9.17 1.88 9.17
1979 | 2.76 6.60 6.57 12.30 5.17 1.54 7.62
1980 | 3.70 12.92 8.46 13.11 2.63 5.99 10.60
1981 | 4.32 15.06 10.04 12.85 5.85 7.38 11.76
1982 | 4.05 11.74 11.49 14.48 8.26 2.63 10.57
1983 | 2.41 8.33 9.01 12.39 7.73 2.61 8.33
1984 | 3.08 6.56 4.88 8.78 8.17 1.46 5.69
1985 | 3.75 6.05 4.82 9.68 7.45 1.85 6.42
1986 | 3.51 7.75 5.16 8.19 9.36 4.69 6.44
1987 | 3.24 8.79 4.07 9.69 6.35 2.53 6.35
1988 | 3.03 7.67 4.30 9.49 4.65 1.75 6.51
1989 | 3.60 7.61 5.91 7.02 5.43 2.02 5.69
1990 | 3.37 7.64 6.08 8.93 2.77 8.25 6.13
1991 | 2.78 11.57 6.61 9.05 17.96 3.51 7.57
1992 | 2.67 8.04 4.70 9.01 15.72 3.68 6.86
1993 | 1.65 8.81 6.42 8.80 11.45 4.45 7.86
1994 | 1.83 7.27 6.46 8.88 6.62 3.57 6.50
1995 | 1.64 5.42 8.06 10.42 4.24 5.54 6.61
1996 | 1.83 7.02 8.10 9.25 3.32 9.16 7.60
1997 | 1.91 5.93 6.89 7.05 2.94 11.07 6.29
1998 |
|
Total | 3.06 8.16 6.37 10.09 7.14 4.84 7.22
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Computed by the author from raw data obtained from the World
Bank.50
TABLE 7
Countries with Persistently High Current Account Deficits:
By Region, 1975-1997*






New Zealand 1975-1988 & 1993-1997

























E.  Middle East
Cyprus 1977-1981
F.  Eastern Europe
None
* The countries in this list have had a “high current account deficit” for at least five
years in a row.  See the text for the exact definition of “high current account deficit.”
Source:  Computed by the author.52
TABLE 8
Current Account Reversals:
Tabulations by Region 1970-1997*
A.  Industrialized
   |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 |        451       93.96       93.96
1 |         29        6.04      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total |        480      100.00
B.  Latin America
          |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
             0 |        359       81.04       81.04
             1 |         84       18.96      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
       Total |        443      100.00
C.  Asia
    |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
             0 |        250       85.91       85.91
             1 |         41       14.09      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
       Total |        291      100.00
D.  Africa
    |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
             0 |        230       72.56       72.56
             1 |         87       27.44      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total  |        317      100.0053
E.  Middle East
     |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
             0 |        156       74.29       74.29
             1 |         54       25.71      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
       Total |        210      100.00
F.  Eastern Europe
          |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
              0 |        134       85.90       85.90
              1 |         22       14.10      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
       Total |        156      100.00
All Countries
         |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
            0 |       1580       83.29       83.29
            1 |        317       16.71      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |       1897      100.00
.
*Reversals are defined as a reduction  in the deficit of at least 3% of GDP in one year.  A
number 1 captures reversals.  The data set has been restricted to countries with population
in excess of half a million people, and GDP per capita over $500 at PPP value.
Source:  Calculated by the author54
TABLE 9
Current Account Reversals and
Medium-Term Improvement




year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 128 5 | 133
1 | 156 12 | 168
-----------+----------------------+----------





year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 156 33 | 189
1 | 174 19 | 193
-----------+----------------------+----------





year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 137 18 | 155
1 | 116 13 | 129
-----------+----------------------+----------





year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 211 72 | 283
1 | 231 61 | 292
-----------+----------------------+----------





year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 45 11 | 56
1| 6 2 8| 7 0
-----------+----------------------+----------
Total | 107 19 | 126




year | reversal in 1 yr
period, | greater 3%
forward | 0 1 | Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0| 6 7 6| 7 3
1| 3 6 6| 4 2
-----------+----------------------+----------
Total | 103 12 | 115
Source:  Calculated by the author.56
TABLE 10
INVESTMENT AND CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS
a. Arellano-Bond Instrumental Variables
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data Number of obs = 1800
Group variable (i): imfcode Number of groups = 127
Wald chi2(5) = 181.56
Time variable (t): year min number of obs = 1
max number of obs = 25
mean number of obs = 14.17323
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
invgdp | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
invgdp |
LD | .6212481 .0835012 7.44 0.000 .4575887 .7849075
govcon |
D1 | .0819257 .1063111 0.77 0.441 -.1264401 .2902916
rev |
D1 | -2.021207 .2545002 -7.94 0.000 -2.520018 -1.522396
revlag |
D1 | -.8834781 .2235849 -3.95 0.000 -1.321696 -.4452596
trade |
D1 | .0436178 .0127593 3.42 0.001 .0186101 .0686255
_cons | -.0480371 .0169209 -2.84 0.005 -.0812014 -.0148727
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
H0: no autocorrelation z = -4.46 Pr>z=0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
H0: no autocorrelation z = -1.08 Pr>z=0.2809
b.  Fixed Effects Method
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 1927
Group variable (i) : imfcode Number of groups = 128
R-sq: within = 0.6523 Obs per group: min = 1
between = 0.9301 avg = 15.1
overall = 0.8357 max = 26
F(5,1794) = 672.98
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.3082 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
invgdp | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
invgdp1 | .7655012 .0139967 54.69 0.000 .7380497 .7929527
govcon | .0326171 .0186247 1.75 0.080 -.0039113 .0691455
rev | -2.05903 .1622943 -12.69 0.000 -2.377336 -1.740724
revlag | -.8404217 .1585791 -5.30 0.000 -1.151441 -.5294026
trade | .0324689 .0051885 6.26 0.000 .0222927 .042645




rho | .31647855 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(127, 1794) = 2.61 Prob>F=0.000057
TABLE 11
GDP GROWTH AND CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS
Feasible Least Squares with Heteroskedastic Panels
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: generalized least squares
Panels: heteroskedastic
Correlation: no autocorrelation
Estimated covariances = 111 Number of obs = 1856
Estimated autocorrelations = 0 Number of groups = 111
Estimated coefficients = 32 Obs per group: min = 1
avg = 19.28987
max = 26
Wald chi2(31) = 708.80
Log likelihood = -4913.651 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
gdpgrowt | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
invgdp | .1732786 .0129535 13.38 0.000 .1478901 .198667
govcon | -.044147 .0129061 -3.42 0.001 -.0694425 -.0188514
trade | .0066118 .0021185 3.12 0.002 .0024595 .010764
loggpp0 | -.7458834 .0754805 -9.88 0.000 -.8938225 -.5979443
rev | -.8387433 .2063497 -4.06 0.000 -1.243181 -.4343053
revlag | -.3106008 .2014468 -1.54 0.123 -.7054293 .0842277
d73 | 1.270318 .759329 1.67 0.094 -.2179398 2.758575
d74 | -1.342419 .7482716 -1.79 0.073 -2.809004 .1241666
d75 | -3.115973 .7482444 -4.16 0.000 -4.582505 -1.649441
d76 | .6267746 .7248618 0.86 0.387 -.7939283 2.047478
d77 | -.9757318 .6522791 -1.50 0.135 -2.254175 .3027116
d78 | .1379759 .5050662 0.27 0.785 -.8519357 1.127887
d79 | -1.096983 .6317958 -1.74 0.083 -2.33528 .1413142
d80 | -2.360201 .6280218 -3.76 0.000 -3.591101 -1.129301
d81 | -2.826354 .6242467 -4.53 0.000 -4.049855 -1.602853
d82 | -4.194326 .6217559 -6.75 0.000 -5.412945 -2.975707
d83 | -2.990355 .6199746 -4.82 0.000 -4.205483 -1.775227
d84 | -1.221758 .6185186 -1.98 0.048 -2.434032 -.0094836
d85 | -1.784731 .6187208 -2.88 0.004 -2.997401 -.5720605
d86 | -1.75282 .617261 -2.84 0.005 -2.962629 -.5430107
d87 | -1.596635 .6173792 -2.59 0.010 -2.806676 -.3865935
d88 | -.7132081 .6150168 -1.16 0.246 -1.918619 .4922027
d89 | -1.492796 .6147887 -2.43 0.015 -2.69776 -.2878324
d90 | -2.005303 .6140373 -3.27 0.001 -3.208794 -.8018121
d91 | -2.686583 .6082038 -4.42 0.000 -3.878641 -1.494526
d92 | -2.38132 .6155925 -3.87 0.000 -3.587859 -1.17478
d93 | -2.23038 .6150288 -3.63 0.000 -3.435814 -1.024945
d94 | -.8790476 .6164939 -1.43 0.154 -2.087353 .3292582
d95 | -.9938183 .5940141 -1.67 0.094 -2.158065 .170428
d96 | -1.480438 .6129868 -2.42 0.016 -2.68187 -.2790063
d97 | -1.263988 .6449348 -1.96 0.050 -2.528037 .0000611
_cons | 7.826786 .8179467 9.57 0.000 6.22364 9.429932
------------------------------------------------------------------------------58
TABLE 12
Frequency of Crises: Alternative Indicators*
A: aevent
(mean) |
event | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2818 94.09 94.09
1 | 177 5.91 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 2995 100.00
B. aevent2
aevent2 | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2318 95.79 95.79
1 | 102 4.21 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 2420 100.00
C. acrisis
(mean) |
crisis | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2548 90.26 90.26
1 | 275 9.74 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 2823 100.00
D. acrisis2
acrisis2 | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 1564 88.91 88.91
1 | 195 11.09 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 1759 100.00
*See the text for the exact definition of these indicators.




Analysis of Crisis and Current Account Reversals
A.  PANEL A
Case: Aevent definition of crisis;
Exposed: Reversal1 definition of current account reversal
Proportion
| Exposed Unexposed | Total Exposed
-----------------+------------------------+----------------------
Cases | 28 124 | 152 0.1842
Controls | 410 1793 | 2203 0.1861
-----------------+------------------------+----------------------
Total | 438 1917 | 2355 0.1860
||
| Point estimate | [95% Conf. Interval]
|------------------------+----------------------
Odds ratio | .9874902 | .6481554 1.504718
(Cornfield)
Prev. frac. ex. | .0125098 | -.504718 .3518446
(Cornfield)
Prev. frac. pop | .0023282 |
+-----------------------------------------------
chi2(1) = 0.00 Pr>chi2 = 0.9536
B.  PANEL B
Case: Aevent definition of crisis;
Exposed: Reversaln1 definition of current account reversal
Proportion
| Exposed Unexposed | Total Exposed
-----------------+------------------------+----------------------
Cases | 52 35 | 87 0.5977
Controls | 563 679 | 1242 0.4533
-----------------+------------------------+----------------------
Total | 615 714 | 1329 0.4628
||
| Point estimate | [95% Conf. Interval]
|------------------------+----------------------
Odds ratio | 1.791829 | 1.15408 2.781784
(Cornfield)
Attr. frac. ex. | .4419112 | .1335086 .6405185
(Cornfield)
Attr. frac. pop | .2641308 |
+-----------------------------------------------
chi2(1) = 6.82 Pr>chi2 = 0.0090
Source: Computed by the author60
TABLE 14
CRISIS PROBIT MODEL: ALL REGIONS
(1971-1992)
A.  ACRISIS
Probit estimates Number of obs = 931
Wald chi2(17) = 56.70
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -274.9083 Pseudo R2 = 0.1103
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
acrisis | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .0033323 .0017217 1.90 0.057 21.0027 -.000042 .006707
conrat | -.0010057 .0007642 -1.30 0.193 32.5979 -.002504 .000492
varrat | -.0025776 .0016872 -1.51 0.131 21.9735 -.005884 .000729
fdistock | -.0052372 .0022728 -2.27 0.023 2.62669 -.009692 -.000783
shorttot | .0019636 .0015704 1.27 0.203 14.6745 -.001114 .005041
pubrat | .0009573 .0010942 0.88 0.381 72.419 -.001187 .003102
multirat | .0020735 .0008301 2.44 0.015 21.4711 .000447 .0037
debty | .0002462 .0002104 1.16 0.247 59.5954 -.000166 .000659
reservem | -.0000357 .0000375 -0.94 0.345 324.331 -.000109 .000038
defrat | .0011096 .0016363 0.68 0.497 5.15325 -.002097 .004317
dlcred | .0010474 .0003367 3.23 0.001 21.875 .000387 .001707
dly | -.0027143 .0013687 -2.00 0.046 3.51322 -.005397 -.000032
istar | .0020625 .0030204 0.68 0.497 8.64066 -.003857 .007982
overvaln | .0001934 .0004058 0.48 0.634 -7.88634 -.000602 .000989
trade | -.0009073 .0005028 -1.74 0.082 46.3937 -.001893 .000078
govcon | -.0001539 .0017092 -0.09 0.928 14.0511 -.003504 .003196
cad | .0031167 .0016689 1.83 0.067 4.36866 -.000154 .006388
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1031149
pred. P | .0773022 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 061
B.  ACRISIS2 Definition of Crisis
Probit estimates Number of obs = 562
Wald chi2(17) = 56.69
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -178.57014 Pseudo R2 = 0.1387
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
acrisis2 | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .0046036 .0026754 1.65 0.100 19.9146 -.00064 .009847
conrat | -.0012766 .0010286 -1.24 0.213 34.1878 -.003293 .000739
varrat | -.0044843 .0025206 -1.71 0.086 21.1016 -.009425 .000456
fdistock | -.0046245 .0028175 -1.65 0.099 3.12262 -.010147 .000898
shorttot | .0014552 .0020551 0.71 0.479 14.7062 -.002573 .005483
pubrat | -.0001517 .0014676 -0.10 0.918 72.5714 -.003028 .002725
multirat | .003031 .0010866 2.66 0.008 21.5175 .000901 .005161
debty | .0002802 .0003342 0.83 0.404 54.2499 -.000375 .000935
reservem | -.0000196 .0000514 -0.38 0.703 328.907 -.00012 .000081
defrat | .0020843 .002524 0.82 0.410 4.60205 -.002863 .007031
dlcred | .0020764 .0005264 4.02 0.000 18.7089 .001045 .003108
dly | -.002937 .0019957 -1.48 0.140 3.97093 -.006849 .000975
istar | .0052748 .0038629 1.36 0.173 8.50495 -.002296 .012846
overvaln | .0005167 .000559 0.91 0.361 -8.22226 -.000579 .001612
trade | -.0008263 .0006416 -1.28 0.201 47.0451 -.002084 .000431
govcon | .0016096 .002514 0.65 0.518 13.8002 -.003318 .006537
cad | .0039213 .0023943 1.61 0.107 3.95843 -.000771 .008614
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1209964
pred. P | .0854189 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 062
C.  Aevent Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 934
Wald chi2(17) = 70.66
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -189.0942 Pseudo R2 = 0.2072
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
aevent | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .0003686 .0008709 0.42 0.671 20.962 -.001338 .002075
conrat | -.000823 .0004234 -1.82 0.069 32.6715 -.001653 6.9e-06
varrat | -.0007301 .0008421 -0.86 0.388 21.9302 -.002381 .000921
fdistock | -.0033417 .0012196 -2.69 0.007 2.62084 -.005732 -.000951
shorttot | -.0000499 .0008731 -0.06 0.955 14.6571 -.001761 .001661
pubrat | -.0001298 .0006229 -0.21 0.836 72.4703 -.001351 .001091
multirat | -.0002948 .0005312 -0.56 0.578 21.4961 -.001336 .000746
debty | .0002863 .0001209 2.49 0.013 59.7336 .000049 .000523
reservem | -.0000194 .0000197 -1.01 0.315 325.061 -.000058 .000019
defrat | .0016828 .0009088 1.85 0.065 5.21531 -.000098 .003464
dlcred | .0004188 .0002005 2.53 0.012 21.8889 .000026 .000812
dly | -.001096 .0008227 -1.34 0.179 3.51907 -.002708 .000516
istar | -.0000236 .0017433 -0.01 0.989 8.63804 -.00344 .003393
overvaln | -.0003881 .0002363 -1.64 0.102 -7.82043 -.000851 .000075
trade | -.001114 .0003071 -3.06 0.002 46.3682 -.001716 -.000512
govcon | -.0037107 .0012011 -2.97 0.003 14.071 -.006065 -.001357
cad | .0003098 .0010221 0.30 0.764 4.37692 -.001693 .002313
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .0706638
pred. P | .0296255 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 063
D.  Aevent2 Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 702
Wald chi2(17) = 48.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Log likelihood = -117.36778 Pseudo R2 = 0.2208
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
aevent2 | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | -.000135 .0009079 -0.15 0.883 19.8866 -.001914 .001644
conrat | -.0003336 .000392 -0.85 0.395 35.0182 -.001102 .000435
varrat | 7.77e-06 .0008146 0.01 0.992 20.4507 -.001589 .001604
fdistock | -.0015405 .0009866 -1.62 0.104 3.08108 -.003474 .000393
shorttot | .0005935 .0007601 0.81 0.416 14.3259 -.000896 .002083
pubrat | .000125 .0005304 0.24 0.810 72.7421 -.000914 .001164
multirat | -.0004797 .0005018 -0.94 0.349 22.8628 -.001463 .000504
debty | .0002004 .0001292 1.62 0.105 54.0278 -.000053 .000454
reservem | -.0000252 .0000191 -1.38 0.166 328.073 -.000063 .000012
defrat | .0022043 .0010298 2.11 0.035 4.93033 .000186 .004223
dlcred | .0005069 .000229 2.74 0.006 18.4827 .000058 .000956
dly | -.0015771 .0008004 -1.90 0.057 4.18559 -.003146 -8.3e-06
istar | .0000685 .0014788 0.05 0.963 8.62569 -.00283 .002967
overvaln | -.0001668 .0002045 -0.84 0.402 -7.73555 -.000568 .000234
trade | -.0007145 .0002938 -2.41 0.016 48.7758 -.00129 -.000139
govcon | -.0028422 .001161 -2.20 0.028 14.5617 -.005118 -.000567
cad | -.0007552 .0009831 -0.79 0.432 4.27947 -.002682 .001172
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .0555556
pred. P | .0206342 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 064
Table 15
Probit Model of Currency Crises
Africa Excluded
(1971-1992)
A.  ACRISIS Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 586
Wald chi2(17) = 47.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Log likelihood = -172.36345 Pseudo R2 = 0.1381
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
acrisis | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .0029271 .0020359 1.42 0.157 26.3123 -.001063 .006917
conrat | -.0012155 .0008973 -1.32 0.186 28.4099 -.002974 .000543
varrat | -.0020405 .0019753 -1.02 0.306 27.1534 -.005912 .001831
fdistock | -.005784 .0024845 -2.24 0.025 3.17666 -.010653 -.000915
shorttot | .0016729 .002148 0.81 0.418 15.9367 -.002537 .005883
pubrat | .0014678 .0013265 1.13 0.258 69.9099 -.001132 .004068
multirat | .0026282 .000894 2.77 0.006 19.8038 .000876 .00438
debty | 3.91e-06 .0003489 0.01 0.991 53.1143 -.00068 .000688
reservem | -7.38e-06 .0000403 -0.18 0.855 412.658 -.000086 .000072
defrat | .0010166 .0019793 0.52 0.606 4.5621 -.002863 .004896
dlcred | .0008556 .0003243 2.85 0.004 25.8435 .00022 .001491
dly | -.0021348 .0017565 -1.24 0.215 3.8471 -.005577 .001308
istar | .0026776 .0036062 0.73 0.466 8.48895 -.00439 .009746
overvaln | -.0000309 .0005285 -0.06 0.953 -5.23607 -.001067 .001005
trade | -.0010877 .0006823 -1.48 0.140 47.171 -.002425 .00025
govcon | .0017909 .0023691 0.76 0.448 13.3222 -.002852 .006434
cad | .0048408 .0021958 2.08 0.037 3.62618 .000537 .009145
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1075085
pred. P | .0718758 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 065
B.  ACRISIS2 Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 349
Wald chi2(17) = 56.33
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -102.86684 Pseudo R2 = 0.2104
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
acrisis2 | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .004239 .0031281 1.27 0.203 25.0805 -.001892 .01037
conrat | -.0013723 .0013069 -1.08 0.279 30.3854 -.003934 .001189
varrat | -.0049427 .0028411 -1.67 0.095 26.3258 -.010511 .000626
fdistock | -.0015863 .0024665 -0.65 0.515 3.68785 -.006421 .003248
shorttot | .001403 .0024508 0.57 0.569 16.3144 -.003401 .006207
pubrat | -.0001419 .001806 -0.08 0.937 69.3619 -.003682 .003398
multirat | .003184 .0011121 2.54 0.011 19.659 .001004 .005364
debty | .0001755 .0006922 0.25 0.800 47.3123 -.001181 .001532
reservem | .0000193 .0000523 0.37 0.709 418.177 -.000083 .000122
defrat | .0015161 .0030651 0.49 0.625 3.85896 -.004491 .007524
dlcred | .0016191 .0005431 3.02 0.003 22.0399 .000555 .002684
dly | -.0028787 .0026685 -1.12 0.261 4.74403 -.008109 .002352
istar | .0047575 .0043004 1.12 0.264 8.25318 -.003671 .013186
overvaln | .0004106 .0006962 0.59 0.555 -3.96003 -.000954 .001775
trade | -.0019974 .0007404 -2.51 0.012 48.4653 -.003448 -.000546
govcon | .0074273 .0029808 2.69 0.007 12.9495 .001585 .01327
cad | .0066269 .0030252 2.15 0.032 2.94552 .000698 .012556
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .1232092
pred. P | .0684454 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 066
C.  AEVENT Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 588
Wald chi2(17) = 64.52
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -121.01338 Pseudo R2 = 0.2262
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
aevent | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | .0005594 .0009588 0.58 0.561 26.2654 -.00132 .002439
conrat | -.0004993 .0005171 -0.89 0.373 28.4811 -.001513 .000514
varrat | -.0002586 .000949 -0.27 0.787 27.1044 -.002119 .001601
fdistock | -.0029753 .0012766 -2.27 0.023 3.16641 -.005477 -.000473
shorttot | .0009613 .0011325 0.91 0.363 15.9162 -.001258 .003181
pubrat | .0012306 .0008209 1.71 0.086 69.9671 -.000378 .00284
multirat | -.0006806 .0006162 -1.21 0.227 19.7912 -.001888 .000527
debty | .0000792 .0001567 0.51 0.613 53.3316 -.000228 .000386
reservem | -.0000334 .0000222 -1.57 0.115 412.677 -.000077 .00001
defrat | .0011607 .0009477 1.19 0.233 4.61603 -.000697 .003018
dlcred | .0002325 .0001554 1.85 0.064 25.8675 -.000072 .000537
dly | -.0015439 .0009927 -1.73 0.084 3.85051 -.003489 .000402
istar | .0001112 .0019632 0.06 0.955 8.4883 -.003737 .003959
overvaln | -.0003815 .0002373 -1.49 0.137 -5.18871 -.000847 .000084
trade | -.0010118 .0003537 -2.52 0.012 47.1363 -.001705 -.000318
govcon | -.0021182 .0012636 -1.57 0.116 13.35 -.004595 .000358
cad | .0018845 .0011319 1.62 0.105 3.64741 -.000334 .004103
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .0748299
pred. P | .0253162 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
.67
D.  AEVENT2 Definition
Probit estimates Number of obs = 424
Wald chi2(17) = 44.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0003
Log likelihood = -73.926915 Pseudo R2 = 0.2642
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
aevent2 | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | -.000477 .0006752 -0.72 0.472 24.5388 -.0018 .000846
conrat | -.0001558 .0003666 -0.41 0.680 31.8778 -.000874 .000563
varrat | .0003588 .0006383 0.57 0.569 24.764 -.000892 .00161
fdistock | -.0011275 .0007419 -1.46 0.145 3.82585 -.002582 .000327
shorttot | .0000871 .0007133 0.12 0.901 15.8634 -.001311 .001485
pubrat | .0002927 .0005123 0.63 0.529 69.6303 -.000711 .001297
multirat | -.0011583 .0005954 -2.48 0.013 21.8597 -.002325 8.6e-06
debty | .0001485 .000146 1.05 0.295 45.5271 -.000138 .000435
reservem | -.000016 .0000162 -1.10 0.271 427.66 -.000048 .000016
defrat | .000573 .0007951 0.71 0.476 4.27868 -.000985 .002131
dlcred | .0000761 .000141 0.61 0.541 21.1944 -.0002 .000353
dly | -.0013861 .0008992 -1.99 0.046 4.62599 -.003148 .000376
istar | -.0002626 .0011823 -0.22 0.823 8.3681 -.00258 .002055
overvaln | -.0003454 .0001643 -2.03 0.042 -4.5647 -.000667 -.000023
trade | -.0008508 .0003236 -3.50 0.000 50.8592 -.001485 -.000217
govcon | -.0004142 .0008319 -0.48 0.630 13.843 -.002045 .001216
cad | .001496 .0009603 1.62 0.105 3.12759 -.000386 .003378
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .0636792
pred. P | .01217 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 068
Table 16
Crisis and the Current Account:
Probit Estimates, Alternative Set of Controls
(Africa Excluded, 1970-1992)
EXCLUDES RESERVES AND DEBT
Probit estimates Number of obs = 591
Wald chi2(15) = 65.13
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -124.15434 Pseudo R2 = 0.2198
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
aevent | dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
comrat | -.0000411 .0008099 -0.05 0.960 26.3022 -.001629 .001546
conrat | -.0005226 .000528 -0.93 0.354 28.4596 -.001557 .000512
varrat | .000294 .000864 0.34 0.731 27.1331 -.001399 .001988
fdistock | -.0034274 .0013471 -2.52 0.012 3.15382 -.006068 -.000787
shorttot | .0009178 .0011867 0.81 0.417 15.9153 -.001408 .003244
pubrat | .0012746 .0008641 1.65 0.099 70.0393 -.000419 .002968
multirat | -.0007383 .0006296 -1.27 0.202 19.7436 -.001972 .000496
defrat | .0017021 .000881 1.85 0.064 4.68826 -.000025 .003429
dlcred | .0002103 .0001511 1.66 0.096 26.0009 -.000086 .000506
dly | -.0018491 .0010946 -1.87 0.062 3.83729 -.003995 .000296
istar | .0003013 .0020829 0.14 0.885 8.48095 -.003781 .004384
overvaln | -.000391 .0002352 -1.52 0.128 -5.48445 -.000852 .00007
trade | -.0010849 .0003564 -2.56 0.011 47.1491 -.001783 -.000386
govcon | -.0019375 .0012981 -1.43 0.153 13.455 -.004482 .000607
cad | .0024955 .001186 2.09 0.037 3.71074 .000171 .00482
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
obs. P | .0761421
pred. P | .0279486 (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 069
FIGURE 1:  On the equilibrium Path of
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B.  Simulated Equilibrium Path of Mexico's
Current Account Deficit